



*USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER*  
***CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL***  
*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

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Issue No. 315, 3 February 2004

**Articles & Other Documents:**

[Bush To Establish Panel To Examine U.S. Intelligence](#)

[U.S. Missile Defense Set To Get Early Start](#)

[Board Games In US Naval Campaign To Halt WMDs](#)

['Kay' Sera, Sera](#)

['We Were All Wrong'](#)

['Sanctions Worked'](#)

[N. Korea Gassing Prisoners, BBC Says](#)

[I Saw An Entire Family Being Killed](#)

[Russia Plans Nuclear Forces Exercise](#)

[Chemical disarmament body to start work in Libya](#)

[Nuclear Talks To Resume, North Korea Says](#)

[Blair Sets Up Inquiry on Prewar Iraq Intelligence](#)

[US Seeks Better WMD Defence](#)

[Suspicious Powder Found in Frist Office](#)

[Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected  
Characteristics of National Strategies Related to  
Terrorism \(GAO Report\)](#)

[Moving Nerve Gas Waste Is Criticized](#)

[Key Pakistani Is Said To Admit Atom Transfers](#)

['Dirty Bomb' A Fear In Scrubbed Flights](#)

[So Much For The WMD](#)

[One Terrorist With Deadly Disease 'Could Cause Deaths Of  
Millions'](#)

[Timing Of Nuclear Talks Up To N. Korea, U.S. Official Says  
Access to Evil](#)

[Revealed: the gas chamber horror of North Korea's gulag](#)

[Bolton Hails Talks On WMD Security](#)

[Powell Says New Data May Have Affected War Decision](#)

[Musharraf Named In Nuclear Probe](#)

[U.S. Treads Carefully With Libya](#)

[Final Confirmation of Ricin Awaited as Senate Is Disrupted](#)

[Experts Describe Tight-Knit Nuclear Black Market](#)

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## Bush To Establish Panel To Examine U.S. Intelligence

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 — President Bush will establish a bipartisan commission in the next few days to examine American intelligence operations, including a study of possible misjudgments about Iraq's unconventional weapons, senior administration officials said Sunday. They said the panel would also investigate failures to penetrate secretive governments and stateless groups that could attempt new attacks on the United States.

The president's decision came after a week of rising pressure on the White House from both Democrats and many ranking Republicans to deal with what the head of the Senate Intelligence Committee has called "egregious" errors that overstated Iraq's stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and made the country appear far closer to developing nuclear weapons than it actually was.

Mr. Bush's agreement to set up a commission to study the Iraq intelligence failures was first reported Sunday by The Washington Post. The officials described the commission Mr. Bush will create as a broader examination of American intelligence shortcomings — from Iran to North Korea to Libya — of which the Iraqi experience was only a part.

The pressure to establish such a panel became irresistible after David A. Kay, the former chief weapons inspector, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that "it turns out we were all wrong, probably," about the perceived Iraqi threat, which was the administration's basic justification for the war.

The commission will not report back until after the November elections. Some former officials who have been approached about taking part say they believe it may take 18 months or more to reach its conclusions.

"It became clear to the president that he couldn't sit there and seem uninterested in the fact that the Iraq intel went off the rails," said one senior official involved in the discussions. "He had to do something, and he chose to enlarge the problem, beyond the Iraq experience."

White House officials said the president was still completing a list of who would serve on the commission, expected to have about nine members. Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, said Sunday that they were talking to "very distinguished statesmen and women, who have served their country and who have been users of intelligence, or served in a gathering capacity." Among those who have been consulted, officials say, is Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser under Mr. Bush's father. Mr. Scowcroft, who was a harsh critic of the process by which the current president decided to go to war, is currently the head of a foreign intelligence advisory board and it is unclear if he will play a role in the new commission.

Mr. Bush's effort is intended to put the study into a broader context — the retooling of American intelligence-gathering for a new era of terrorism and nuclear proliferation by rogue scientists and countries that may pass weapons into the hands of groups like Al Qaeda. But it is far from clear that those steps will insulate him from Democrats' charges that the White House tried to manipulate the Iraq intelligence to justify the March invasion. Nor is it clear whether the commission's broader mandate will keep it from delving too deeply into the specific failures by the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies in the case of Iraq. Mr. Bush has been trying to avoid identifying individuals or agencies responsible for the Iraq failures. Senior administration officials concede they do not want to risk further alienating the C.I.A. or the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet. In interviews on Sunday, White House officials rejected direct comparisons to the commission that is examining the intelligence failures surrounding the Sept. 11 attacks, or the commission that issued a blistering critique of NASA after the Columbia disaster a year ago. Instead, a senior White House official said Sunday afternoon, Mr. Bush intends to order a look "at the global security challenges of the 21st century."

The draft of the executive order specifically orders the commission to compare intelligence about Iraq with what was found on the ground there. But it is not clear whether the commission will decide to delve into issues beyond how the intelligence was gathered, and specifically how it was used. In the case of Iraq, that could put the commission into the midst of the politically charged question of whether the most dire-sounding possibilities were de-emphasized by Bush administration officials to build a national and international consensus on the need to take military action. The White House has denied any such effort to filter the intelligence.

"It has to have that included," Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Sunday on Fox News, making an argument that has divided Democrats and Republicans for months in the debate in Congress about prewar intelligence. "And that is still not settled."

While other studies of American intelligence lapses have been ordered by past administrations, none has taken place at the level of a presidential commission. Nor have they operated in the midst of a heated political debate over whether the president was the victim of bad intelligence, as Republicans argue, or whether he sought to cherry-pick

the evidence that would justify the decision to go to war, as many of the Democratic candidates for president have contended.

Officials familiar with the discussions over the creation of the commission say that besides the Iraq experience, the commission may examine the failure to detect preparations for the nuclear tests that Pakistan and India set off in 1998, missed signals about how quickly Iran and Libya were moving toward a bomb with the aid of Pakistani scientists, and Al Qaeda's focus on an attack on the American mainland.

In Dr. Kay's testimony, he noted that the same intelligence agencies that overestimated Iraq's abilities seemed to have underestimated Iran's and Libya's, and still cannot get a clear fix on North Korea's.

Only last week, asked about setting up an inquiry, Mr. Bush said he would await the findings of the Iraq Survey Group, which was asked to find Iraq's unconventional weapons and which Dr. Kay led until last month. But it quickly became clear, White House officials said, that that position was untenable.

Senator Pat Roberts, the Kansas Republican who is chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said last week that he would not stand in the way of an independent intelligence inquiry as long as it did not interfere with the months-long investigation by his panel, which plans to distribute a draft report to members of Congress on Thursday.

The Senate panel "for the last six, seven, eight, nine months, has had 10 staffers working 24/7 on floor-to-ceiling documents and doing the most thorough investigative job on the entire intelligence community that's been done in 20 years," Mr. Roberts said in an interview last week. "We now have our draft report. I would at least like to get the draft report out and make it public, and then if people feel like they have to have an independent investigation, that's fine."

Mr. Roberts has said the draft report by his committee staff had found no evidence that the Bush administration put pressure on intelligence analysts to exaggerate the dangers posed by Iraq — a conclusion that matches one offered by Dr. Kay in his testimony last week. But the Senate report is expected to be highly critical of the Central Intelligence Agency and its counterparts.

Representative Porter J. Goss, the Florida Republican who is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and one of the C.I.A.'s closest allies in Congress, said in an interview on Friday that "unless we're prepared for another intelligence failure, we need to get about the business of improving our intelligence service."

Mr. Goss added, however, that he believed that any new broad-based reviews should be forward-looking — exactly the path Mr. Bush appears to have chosen.

One senior House Republican aide said an independent review could also have a political benefit for Republicans by providing a forum to attack Democrats for shortchanging intelligence in previous years, an emerging Republican theme against Senator John Kerry, the front-runner for the Democratic nomination for president. Mr. Kerry has been particularly blistering in his assessment of how Mr. Bush used American intelligence, saying he was "misled" by Mr. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell as they urged him and his colleagues to vote for a resolution authorizing military action against Iraq.

Congressional officials said Sunday that Mr. Cheney had been in contact with leaders of the Senate Intelligence Committee from both parties to discuss a possible blueprint for a broad, independent review of the state of American intelligence agencies. But Mr. Cheney, known for his reticence, gave little indication of what form the inquiry might take.

Mr. Cheney himself has much at stake in the path the commission takes: He offered some of the most dire statements about Iraq's abilities in the months leading up to the war. "It's not surprising," one White House official said, "that he's been so involved in the creation of the commission."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/international/middleeast/02WEAP.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Baltimore Sun  
February 2, 2004

## **Moving Nerve Gas Waste Is Criticized**

*Army planning to dispose of Indiana VX stockpiles, possibly using Md. route*

By Heather Dewar, Sun Staff

Sometime this summer, tanker trucks filled with a caustic chemical soup of leftovers from a lethal chemical warfare agent will begin rolling through the Mid-Atlantic region on a 900-mile journey from an Army storage depot in Indiana to a treatment plant in Deepwater, N.J.

At least two 4,000-gallon tankers loaded with breakdown products from the nerve agent VX - a slurry of lye, water and the weapon's original man-made ingredients - will leave the Newport Chemical Depot every day, seven days a week for more than a year under a new Army disposal plan.

The tankers will travel by yet-to-be-determined routes to a DuPont chemical waste treatment plant just north of the Delaware Memorial Bridge, according to a DuPont spokesman. There, the slurry would go through a multistage treatment process before the last remaining wastes are discharged into the Delaware River.

This is the Army's second attempt to get rid of Newport's VX. A similar proposal alarmed officials in Ohio, where intense local opposition scotched plans to dispose of the material in Dayton. In New Jersey and neighboring Delaware, environmental groups and members of Congress are peppering the Army with questions and concerns. "We want to see the stockpile of VX destroyed," said John M. Kearney, director of Delaware's Clean Air Council, "but safety should be the top priority. There's risks in transport, storage and handling all the way along the path, and we feel the risks outweigh the benefits."

The VX dispute is the latest example of the problems that arise when the Army tries to get rid of some of the world's most dangerous weapons. International law requires the United States to destroy its chemical stockpiles, stored at seven sites nationwide, including Maryland's Aberdeen Proving Ground.

The government sped up plans to destroy the weapons after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, fearing they would become terrorist targets. Now the Army must quickly make a complex set of calculations involving experimental chemistry, the odds of an accident - and eventually local politics.

The Army originally planned to truck the VX wastes, known as VX hydrolysate or VXH, to a treatment plant near Dayton, about 220 miles east of Newport. But it withdrew the proposal in October amid concern about the risks of an accidental spill and fears that toxic residues would foul local waterways.

The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency questioned the project and an independent expert criticized it. A community group sued to block the plan, and 25 local governments cast protest votes against it.

"It was the biggest thing going on here for months," said Dina Pierce, a spokeswoman for the Ohio EPA.

Spokesmen for the Army and for DuPont say there's no need for concern.

"This is our business," said Anthony Farina of DuPont's Secure Environmental Treatment plant at Deepwater, which will ship and dispose of the VXH under contract to the Army. The company is testing small amounts of the slurry to ensure its proposed treatment will work. The shipments won't go forward unless it does, he said.

"We would not accept any waste stream unless we could treat it safely, and with no harmful effects to our workers, our community and the environment," Farina said. "We'll know more about this in the next month or so."

An Army spokesman noted that before the chemical is loaded onto tankers, preliminary treatment in Newport will reduce levels of deadly VX to less than 20 parts per billion - the point where the nerve agent is undetectable.

"There's no VX in it," said Jeff Lindblad, a spokesman for the Army's Chemical Materials Agency, based at Aberdeen Proving Ground. "What you're ending up with is caustic wastewater."

Lindblad said the wastewater is similar to household drain cleaner - and no more dangerous than hundreds of other chemicals that travel America's roads every day.

But Bruce E. Rittmann, an engineering professor at Northwestern University, came to a different conclusion when he studied the Army's plans last year as a consultant to Montgomery County, Ohio. "I don't think this is just household drain cleaner," he said. "It's considerably riskier than that."

VX itself is an odorless, oily liquid that attacks the nervous system through the skin, eyes or lungs, causing death in minutes. It was manufactured at Newport in the 1950s and 1960s, and about 1,200 tons of it were left there in 1969, when President Richard M. Nixon halted the U.S. chemical weapons program.

In Newport, VX is stored in 1-ton steel casks that look like beer kegs, according to visitors. The Army plans to empty the casks into giant sealed mixers, then add hot lye and water to break the chemical bonds that lock the ingredients into a deadly form. The resulting slurry has a strong skunk-like odor, Lindblad said.

Once the tankers are loaded, the mixture separates into a layer of man-made chemicals about the consistency of diesel fuel, floating on a solution of water and lye, according to Army documents. The mixture is classed as a hazardous waste because it is dangerously corrosive, and some ingredients are banned by international law as potential chemical weapons in their own right.

"Stand-alone, these things do have some toxic properties, but in this mix they're no more hazardous than table salt," Lindblad said.

But the Army's VXH chemical information sheets, prepared to help hazardous materials teams respond to an accident, say the mixture includes six potentially toxic chemicals. Among them are minute amounts of a nerve agent called EA 2192 - a "daughter" chemical produced during the initial treatment that is almost as potent as VX. There are also larger quantities of several man-made acids that are little studied and poorly understood.

#### **Caution in Ohio**

The safety limits of those chemicals are "unknown," according to the Army's information sheets. Only one of them is listed in government or industry databases of hazardous chemicals, where its entry says: "toxicity data have not been evaluated."

"These are pretty unique compounds," said Harold O'Connell, a hazardous chemicals expert at the Ohio EPA. "We just don't have a track record. It's not like you can go to a chemical dictionary and look up these compounds and their effects."

The Ohioans were especially worried about VXH spilling into a stream, pond or drainage ditch, because the mixture is caustic enough to kill aquatic plants and animals.

At 20 parts per billion - the maximum concentration in the treated mixture - VX killed half of the striped bass exposed to it in about 18 hours, according to a report by the Ohio EPA. An agency toxicologist "strongly recommended" against discharging the final residues into any body of water until their effects are better known.

Denny Bristow, coordinator of the Dayton Regional Hazardous Materials Response Team, said his main concern about VXH was the lack of basic information - such as its response to heat, cold and pressure. "If I have 4,000 gallons of Drano, I could predict how fast it would evaporate and where the vapor cloud would go," Bristow said, "but without the vapor pressure of the [VXH] I wasn't able to make those predictions."

Army and DuPont representatives say the risk of an accident is low. The tankers will be sealed, equipped with vacuum pumps to mop up spills quickly and driven by specially trained workers, they said.

DuPont has not decided whether the slurry will travel by highway or by a combination of road and rail, Farina said. If it travels by road, the company would probably stick to current hazardous chemical routes, he said. He declined to identify the Maryland roads, other than Interstate 95, that DuPont routinely uses.

In December, the Army considered two possible routes. One passed through Ohio and Pennsylvania. The other curved south into West Virginia and cut through about 50 miles of Western Maryland - along Interstate 68 from the West Virginia line to Cumberland, and up Route 220 to the Pennsylvania line.

#### **Safer route**

Although the Maryland route was 80 miles longer, it passed through less-populated areas, according to analysts at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory who studied the issue for the Army.

Using federal accident statistics, Oak Ridge estimated that VXH tankers would be involved in three accidents over the course of the shipments - all involving only property damage and no injuries.

A spokesman for the Maryland State Highway Administration said there have been 355 crashes on I-68 west of Cumberland in the past three years, 58 of which involved trucks. There have been 33 accidents on Route 220, including four truck crashes.

Farina, the DuPont spokesman, said the company has not ruled out any route options.

Farina said the company will hold public meetings and solicit comments on the VXH plan in communities around the Deepwater, N.J., plant. DuPont needs a permit from New Jersey to discharge the final waste product into the Delaware River, but it does not need permission to truck the VXH through other states.

Richard McIntire, a spokesman for the Maryland Department of the Environment, said the agency has not been informed of the Army's plan. "Oftentimes, the military acts and sets up stuff with local authorities and we don't have any knowledge of it," he said.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/nationworld/bal-te.nerve02feb02,0,3704725.story?coll=bal-home-headlines>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

February 2, 2004

Pg. 10

## **U.S. Missile Defense Set To Get Early Start**

### ***Pentagon Planning to Deploy Interceptors At Alaskan Military Base by This Summer***

By Bradley Graham, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon plans to begin operation of a national missile defense system this summer, putting the first missile interceptors on alert weeks ahead of a previous autumn deadline, according to senior defense officials.

The accelerated schedule, if realized, would enable President Bush to claim fulfillment of a major 2000 campaign pledge earlier than officials had indicated. The United States currently lacks a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Erecting such a system has been not only a top Bush priority but also a longtime Republican Party goal.

Democratic lawmakers have challenged the urgency and expense of the project, and scientists and other critics have warned that Bush's approach relies on unproven technology.

Disclosing the planned summer start, Pentagon officials insisted in interviews that politics played no part in revising the schedule. They said the change grew out of the realization that the system could begin providing some anti-missile protection before all 10 of the interceptors slated for fielding this year had been lowered into silos in Alaska and California.

"If we could have some capability, we'd be negligent not to put it out as early as we could," said one senior military officer involved in the program. "It has nothing to do with a politically motivated date. We've never been told to speed it up."

Whether the Bush administration is moving too fast to deploy the anti-missile system was in dispute even before the latest shift, with the Pentagon's own top weapons evaluator recently raising a warning flag. In a status report last month on major new weapons programs, Thomas P. Christie, director of the Pentagon's office of Operational Test and Evaluation, said a shortage of testing data would likely make it difficult for him to assess the system's effectiveness ahead of any deployment this year.

He expressed concern about the small number and relatively simple nature of flight tests, noting they have used the same course each time and have relied on surrogates and prototypes for key elements still under development.

Problems with a new booster, designed to carry the interceptor vehicle into space, prompted the Pentagon to suspend flight intercept attempts after the last test in December 2002.

The next flight tests are scheduled for May and July; thus, the Pentagon could end up activating the anti-missile system before results of the summer tests have been fully assessed.

Nonetheless, program officials say that previous tests have given them enough confidence to justify a recommendation to go forward this summer. In eight tests since 1999, interceptors have scored five hits against mock warheads, validating -- in the view of program officials -- the principle of using a missile to hit a missile.

"We have seen nothing in terms of a showstopper that would prevent us from putting the system on alert," the senior military officer said.

The system relies on land-based interceptors to soar and ram into enemy warheads headed toward the United States. It is intended as just one layer of what Bush envisions will be a multilayered network of defenses. Other systems under development are aimed at striking missiles soon after launch with land- or sea-based interceptors or airborne lasers. Should a missile survive these layers of defense, another system of interceptors would target it as it descended.

Adopting a phased approach to establishing this expansive network, Bush in late 2002 ordered the deployment of the first 10 long-range interceptors by the end of 2004 -- six at Fort Greely in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Internally, Pentagon officials set Sept. 30 this year as the deadline for opening the Fort Greely facility.

The idea of going on alert earlier at Fort Greely emerged from a military exercise before the U.S. invasion of Iraq last year, the senior officer said. The exercise, which involved Patriot anti-missile batteries and focused on devising an air defense network for the Iraq war, showed the benefit of putting some network elements into service before all were in place.

A senior Pentagon civilian also cited Israel's experience in the past few years with its Arrow anti-missile system. Individual elements of that system have been declared operational as soon as they have been built.

"The Israelis have done that for deterrence purposes," the official said. "They have wanted to send a message to their neighbors that the system was ready, even if still had a ways to go."

The Pentagon plans to start loading interceptors into silos at Fort Greely in May or June, continuing through the autumn there and into January at Vandenberg. Software improvements to a critical tracking radar, known as Cobra Dane and located on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, are due for completion in July. Shortly after that, the anti-missile system could go on alert for the first time.

"We anticipate that it would be before the September time frame that we've used as a planning date in the past," the senior officer said.

By starting the system, while still installing the first batch of interceptors, operators can gain early experience and quickly spot any potential glitches, thereby smoothing the way for completion of the deployment, officials said.

"What we're trying to get away from is the idea that we're going to have one switch that we're going to throw at midnight on a certain date, and everything is going to be operational," the senior officer said.

By the end of 2005, plans call for adding 10 more interceptors at Fort Greely as well as 10 ship-based, intermediate-range interceptors, a new floating tracking radar and an upgraded radar at Fylingdales in Great Britain. In his 2005 budget request, which goes to Congress this week, Bush is seeking more than \$10 billion for missile defense, up from \$9.1 billion this year.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4411-2004Feb1.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

# Key Pakistani Is Said To Admit Atom Transfers

By David Rohde and David E. Sanger

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Feb. 1 — The founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has signed a detailed confession admitting that during the last 15 years he provided Iran, North Korea and Libya with the designs and technology to produce the fuel for nuclear weapons, according to a senior Pakistani official and three Pakistani journalists who attended a special government briefing here on Sunday night.

In a two-and-a-half-hour presentation to 20 Pakistani journalists, a senior government official gave an exhaustive and startling account of how Dr. Khan, a national hero, spread secret technology to three countries that have been striving to produce their own nuclear arsenals. Two of them, Iran and North Korea, were among those designated by President Bush as part of an "axis of evil."

If the Pakistani government account is correct, Dr. Khan's admission amounts to one of the most complex and successful efforts to evade international controls to stop nuclear proliferation.

The account provided by Pakistan on Sunday night came after years in which the government strongly denied that it or scientists at the Khan Research Laboratories had given crucial technology to other nations.

Officials detailed how Dr. Khan had presided over a network that smuggled nuclear hardware on chartered planes, had shared secret designs for the centrifuges that produce the enriched uranium necessary to develop a nuclear weapon, and had given personal briefings to Iranian, Libyan and North Korean scientists in covert meetings abroad. Dr. Khan said he shared the technology because he thought the emergence of more nuclear states would ease Western attention on Pakistan, the senior official told journalists. He also said he thought it would help the Muslim cause.

The Bush administration offered no public comment on the Pakistani announcement on Sunday. But in recent weeks, administration officials have said that they forced the government of President Pervez Musharraf to confront the evidence, after Iran and Libya made disclosures that showed their reliance on Pakistani-supplied technology.

"This is the break we have been waiting for," a senior American official said. But the account provided by Pakistani officials carefully avoided pinning any blame on General Musharraf, the army or the Pakistani intelligence service, despite the fact that some of the material — especially what was sent to North Korea — appeared to have been transported on government cargo planes.

Pakistani and American officials have said senior Pakistani Army officials would have known if nuclear hardware had been shipped out of a tightly guarded nuclear facility.

The senior official told journalists that all nuclear transfers ceased after General Musharraf established a new National Command Authority to oversee the country's nuclear arsenal in early 2002. But according to American accounts, the nuclear transfers to Libya continued through last fall.

The Khan laboratory has for years been the crown jewel of the Pakistani nuclear program, and it received the highest-level support after Dr. Khan stole the basic technology for uranium enrichment from a European consortium, Urenco, in the late 1970's.

Dr. Khan's house has been surrounded by Pakistani security officials for several weeks, and he could not be reached for comment on Sunday. A spokesman for the families of Dr. Khan and six detained officials who the government says aided him said they would respond to the government allegations on Monday.

It was unclear whether Dr. Khan would be arrested, or whether General Musharraf's government would be further shaken by his decision to take on a man revered as the creator of the first Islamic bomb.

At the briefing on Sunday night, the Pakistani official insisted that the country's military and intelligence officials had been unaware of Dr. Khan's activities during the past decade, despite the huge houses and lavish life he maintained on a relatively modest government stipend.

"There were intelligence lapses on our part, and we admit to them," the official said, according to the journalists who attended the meeting. "We should not have allowed this loose administrative and security system to have prevailed."

There was no way to independently verify the senior official's account, though senior American officials said parts of it seemed in accord with intelligence they had gathered and provided to Pakistan.

The news of the confession came a day after Pakistan's government removed Dr. Khan from a senior government post. The government has been gradually paving the way for the announcement since December, when it first admitted that its scientists might have operated "for personal profit."

Until that time, accounts of secrets given up by the Khan laboratory were met by a string of denials. But after receiving detailed evidence last year from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States, Pakistan began an investigation into possible nuclear transfers to Iran and Libya in November.

The investigation has gained speed ever since, and General Musharraf personally questioned Dr. Khan, American officials say.



The senior Pakistani official said Dr. Khan transferred nuclear weapons-related designs, drawings and components to Iran between 1989 and 1991, according to the three journalists. He transferred nuclear technology to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997, they said, though American officials believe that the transfers to Libya continued until just four months ago.

Dr. Khan also transferred additional technology to North Korea until 2000, the Pakistanis said. That is particularly significant because North Korea has denied, as recently as last month, that it has a secret uranium enrichment project under way, in addition to the plutonium project at Yongbyon that the C.I.A. believes has already produced several weapons.

Details from Dr. Khan's confession, if made available from the United States, could have a major effect on the negotiations to disarm North Korea, American officials said.

The Pakistani official who briefed reporters said Dr. Khan had met with Libyan nuclear scientists in Casablanca, Morocco, and in Istanbul; American officials were apparently unaware of the Istanbul meeting. He also met Iranian scientists in Karachi, Pakistan, and scientists in Malaysia, the journalists reported.

Dr. Khan made direct shipments of nuclear hardware through Dubai, in the Persian Gulf, and chartered flights to North Korea that may have included the shipments on government planes. American intelligence officials believe that he visited North Korea more than a dozen times.

He also tried to ship nuclear hardware by land from Pakistan to Iran with the aid of a Karachi businessman, the officials said.

According to the Pakistani account, centrifuges came from a factory in Malaysia that had been built by a Sri Lankan identified as "Tahir," who was one of several middlemen Dr. Khan used to spread the technology.

The Pakistani official said, and American officials confirmed, that Tahir was in government custody in Malaysia. Centrifuge components made in Malaysia were intercepted en route to Libya in October, American officials said.

The other middlemen were three Germans identified by the senior official only by their last names — "Brummer," "Heinz," and "Liech" — the journalists said. A Dutch citizen identified by Pakistani officials as "Hanks" was also described as a middleman, though American intelligence officials believe that Hank is his first name. The man is believed to have some connection to Urenco, the European conglomerate where Dr. Khan once worked. Dr. Khan was convicted in absentia for stealing technology there, though the conviction was overturned on a technicality.

Dr. Khan smuggled out of Pakistan a mix of new and untested centrifuges and centrifuge parts, the senior official said. Some of the machines and components were defective, by his account.

The Pakistani officials charged Sunday night that after their government opened an inquiry into possible nuclear transfers in November, Dr. Khan wrote to Iranian officials and urged them to destroy some of their facilities and to tell officials that the Pakistanis who aided them had died. He also threatened to kill one of his subordinates in 2001 if he told anyone of the transfer, they said.

The senior government official told journalists that the Pakistani government first heard rumors that nuclear technology was leaving the country for North Korea in 2000. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency conducted a raid on a plane chartered by Dr. Khan that was bound for North Korea, but found nothing on board. Two years later, in the fall of 2002, an American delegation to North Korea led by James A. Kelly, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, confronted the North with intelligence that the country had a secret uranium enrichment facility. He based his charges on evidence first collected by South Korean intelligence agencies. According to the American account, North Korea admitted to having such a project, though it later insisted that it had been misunderstood, and had no such program.

American officials relayed the information to Pakistan, urging action. But when the news became public, Pakistan denied that its scientists had any role. On Sunday, however, the senior Pakistani official acknowledged that the government had found documents at the Khan Research Laboratories that showed equipment had been shipped out of the facility.

In February 2003, American officials showed Pakistani officials satellite images of Iran's large centrifuge complex, whose existence was disclosed by Iranian dissidents. American officials said the scale and design of the project suggested that the Iranians were getting aid from an advanced program like Pakistan's — a charge that was confirmed when inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear regulatory body, toured the facilities.

The inspectors discovered that some equipment had been contaminated with weapons-grade uranium, though it was unclear whether Iran had produced that material, or the equipment had been previously contaminated. The senior official here told journalists that the high enrichment level indicated that the equipment had come from Pakistan, the journalists said.

Iranian officials also informed Atomic Energy Agency officials that three Germans and two South Asians had aided their program, prompting Pakistan to open its inquiry in November. In mid-January, Libya informed Pakistani officials that they too had received nuclear aid from Pakistanis.



The senior official said Dr. Muhammad Farooq, the head of overseas procurement, had played a critical role in aiding Dr. Khan. He worked closely with the Sri Lankan middleman, the official said. The Sri Lankan established the factory in Malaysia that built components based on Pakistani designs, the official said. Dr. Farooq also traveled with Dr. Khan to the meetings with Libyan officials in Istanbul and Casablanca and recorded some of the conversations.

The senior official told journalists that General Musharraf would address the nation about the results of the inquiry, and any disciplinary action, shortly after a series of national holidays, which end on Thursday.

*David Rohde reported from Islamabad for this article and David E. Sanger from Washington.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/international/asia/02STAN.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

London Financial Times

February 2, 2004

Pg. 18

## **Board Games In US Naval Campaign To Halt WMDs**

*Despite international misgivings, the security operation has seen some success, writes Mark Huband on board USS Peleliu in the Arabian Sea*

The shimmering jewellery and earrings made the big, bearded man look more like a pirate than a former Soviet dictator, but when heavily armed US marines broke open the door of his cabin on a merchant ship, they found documents attesting to his name: Joseph Stalin.

The marines were joined by soldiers from Spanish special forces, who began swarming over Mr Stalin's ship hunting for proof that it was carrying bomb-making equipment and the ingredients of the toxin ricin.

Mr Stalin and his crew were hauled on deck to be interrogated.

But, like Mr Stalin's name, the boarding of the small merchant ship on the Arabian Sea last month was something of a fabrication. The raid was part of an exercise called "Sea Saber", being conducted off the coast of Oman.

The operation was part of a new campaign that US President George W. Bush's administration believes is key to tackling the threat of unconventional weapons proliferation. Launched by the White House in May, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has already signed up 16 countries vowing to back interdiction efforts to stop the flow of material used in building weapons of mass destruction.

The PSI has caused discomfort among some allies. Russia - which, with its huge stocks of ageing nuclear technologies, is one of the gravest proliferation risks - last week balked at joining the initiative during a trip to Moscow by John Bolton, the US state department's outspoken undersecretary, saying it questioned whether the ship boardings complied with international law.

But, despite such misgivings, the PSI programme has already chalked up one notable success - seizing parts for centrifuges that could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons on a ship bound for Libya last October. The seizure helped accelerate UK-led negotiations with Tripoli that led to Libya's agreement to abandon its WMD programme.

There are no doubts on the bridge of USS Peleliu, a helicopter and aircraft carrier, where Rear Admiral Bob Conway, overall commander of the Sea Saber operation, enthused over the US navy's technical ability to pursue the aims of "GWOT" - the global war on terror.

"This is ballet," he said, watching as the seven ships, including a submarine, from the Bahrain-based US Fifth Fleet under his command came together for the boarding.

For him, such tactics are one of the concrete ways conventional militaries can deal with the threats posed by terrorists. He ticks off the missiles and surveillance assets he can use to shake up the proliferators' supply chain.

"It's like vegetables: you put it in a pot, stir it up, and see if you can get somewhere. During an exercise, such operations can appear deceptively easy."

"Why do you want to know our cargo?" the suspect captain had pleaded in a fractious radio exchange when first contacted by the battlegroup.

"We are simple, friendly people. We are carrying 3.5 tonnes of soybeans."

Later, troops disgorging from helicopters had him lying on the floor of the wheel room, a pistol at his head.

Navy experts then tested the mock cargo and declared it highly dangerous.

But other than the seizure of the German-registered ship bound for Libya, most of the PSI captures thus far have been of drugs.

During the last two weeks of December, the same fleet seized three motorised "dhows" in the area carrying hashish and other narcotics whose street value was about Dollars 50m (Pounds 27m).

Still, PSI strategists are keen to draw credit from these seizures.

"Drugs and terrorism tend to follow the same channels. A lot of the lessons we have learned have come from running into drugs," said Lt Andrew Clark, a US navy intelligence officer.

More problematic may prove to be the legal issues surrounding such seizures.

Prior to the PSI launch, Spanish forces apprehended a Cambodian-registered ship - the So San - bound for Yemen, which was found to be carrying 15 North Korean Scud missiles. The So San's cargo was later deemed legal, however, and the US ordered the ship released.

The incident triggered a debate over the right to board ships on the high seas, an issue given new relevance following the failed US diplomatic mission to Moscow last week.

A detailed analysis issued last September by the Washington-based Bipartisan Security Group argued that short of a UN security council resolution or clear evidence that shipments are intended for terrorists, there is no clear legal justification for the interdictions: "'Powerful states may be able to bend international law, but they cannot rewrite it.'"

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

February 2, 2004

## 'Dirty Bomb' A Fear In Scrubbed Flights

*Intelligence pointed to a possible Al Qaeda use of unconventional arms, a U.S. official says.*

By Sebastian Rotella, Times Staff Writer

PARIS — The terror alert that caused the cancellation of several transatlantic flights this weekend was based partly on intelligence that Al Qaeda might use chemical, biological or radiological weapons in an aviation attack, a U.S. official familiar with the case said Sunday.

"A chemical, biological or 'dirty bomb' attack has always been a concern with regard to aviation," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity. "And that was one of the concerns in this case."

After the U.S. government warned Saturday of "a specific and credible threat," British Airways canceled two London-Washington round trips and a London-Miami flight, while Air France grounded two Paris-Washington flights. Those flights were scheduled for Sunday and today.

On Sunday, Continental Airlines canceled a flight from Washington to Houston due to arrive while the Super Bowl was being played at Reliant Stadium, about 28 miles from the international airport. That action came a day after Continental grounded a flight from Glasgow, Scotland, to Los Angeles.

"There was specific threat information on Continental Flight 1519 from Washington to Houston, and that information was shared with the airline," said Suzanne Luber, a spokeswoman for the Department of Homeland Security in Washington. "We don't have any information that it was connected to the Super Bowl. It was a specific threat related to the flight number and the date, but not as to what kind of threat."

Since December, law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe have detected signs that terrorists might have been plotting an airborne attack. The primary concerns were that terrorists would smuggle a bomb aboard a plane or attempt a Sept. 11-style hijacking to use a plane as a missile against an American target. U.S. authorities put out an alert about smuggled explosives after the November arrest of a British suspect who allegedly rigged plastic explosives in a pair of socks connected by a piece of string — a device he allegedly intended to use to sneak a bomb-making kit past airport security.

But a flurry of intelligence in December that led to eight cancellations of U.S.-bound flights, including six Paris-Los Angeles trips before Christmas, also made reference to unconventional weapons, according to the senior U.S. official.

"The alert about flights did not exclude a possible chem, bio or radioactive attack last time, in December," the official said. "But this dimension of the threat seems to be more developed in the intelligence this time."

The possibility of smuggling a biological agent onto an airplane poses a distressing new danger, a key U.S. senator said Sunday.

"Nobody has any idea about what to do about [biological agents] on an airplane or on the ground," Sen. John D.

"Jay" Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said on "Fox News Sunday."

"That's partly the problem of not checking cargo, and it's partly the problem of biological weapons, which nobody has figured out really what to do about yet.... It's very dangerous."

Police in France and Britain have broken up two related plots that allegedly involved attacks with crude poisons, including cyanide and ricin. In late 2002, French police found a special protective suit designed for handling nuclear and toxic materials when they arrested a number of Algerians accused of plotting a cyanide gas attack on the Russian Embassy in Paris.

In a related operation weeks later, British police rounded up more Algerian suspects and found a crude lab for producing ricin, a poison with no antidote, in a London apartment.

Despite the previous cases involving unconventional weapons in Europe, the threat that led to this weekend's cancellations may involve terrorists based elsewhere who decided to target Air France and British Airways planes, the U.S. official said.

*Times staff writer David G. Savage in Washington contributed to this report.*

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-fly2feb02,1,2957463.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Wall Street Journal

February 2, 2004

## 'Kay' Sera, Sera

By R. James Woolsey

So which is it: Are America's spies a gaggle of fools for believing that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction? Or is the Bush administration a gang of knaves for lying us into a war?

Take the spies-as-fools allegation first.

There was no substantial disagreement between the U.S. and other countries before the war about the likelihood -- based on a history of deception -- that Saddam Hussein retained weapons of mass destruction. Jacques Chirac warned last February about "the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq" and added "the international community is right . . . in having decided that Iraq should be disarmed." David Kay has spoken of German and Russian intelligence reports that "painted a picture of Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction." The Israelis procured gas masks for every citizen. If Saddam actually disposed of all his weapons and stocks of chemical and biological agent well before last year's war began, many countries were deceived.

But we are now learning something further from Mr. Kay's recent disclosures: that there were quite specific pre-war indications of WMD -- "reports of movement" of weapons themselves, of "weapons being assigned to specific units as well as specific locations." This may explain the press reports that appeared in this newspaper and elsewhere late last year. Each captured Iraqi general being interrogated was convinced that, although his own unit had no chemical weapons, the units on his right and left flanks certainly did.

There are several possible explanations for such indications of the presence of actual weapons. First, Saddam, knowing that he had destroyed his stockpiles, may have spread false stories that he knew would reach our ears in order to intimidate us. We pulled up short of Baghdad in 1991 and he may have thought such lies could help deter us again. He may also have wanted to maintain his reputation for having WMD, as Mr. Kay suggests, to look formidable in the Arab world and intimidate his own people. The oddest possibility Mr. Kay suggests is that Saddam may have been deceived himself by some of his own scientists into paying for non-existent WMD programs while the scientists pocketed the funds. This would amount to his having been our co-victim in a fraud run by other Iraqis. A second possibility is that stockpiles were destroyed, but some only at the last minute -- as war began -- so that these latter did exist when the intelligence estimates were made. There have been intriguing press reports on this point, including a story in the New York Times last April about an Iraqi intelligence officer who said he was asked to destroy chemical weapons material just as the war started. Such a last-minute cleaning up would fit with reported Franco-Russian efforts early last year to help Iraq obtain a cease-fire coupled with thorough inspections.

Third, reports from both Mr. Kay and earlier ones from intelligence imagery analysts have indicated that some WMD-related material probably crossed into Syria early last year. So some stockpiles may have been exported as the war began. Others may have been hidden then.

But for last-minute destruction, shipment or hiding, the volumes of biological or chemical agent would have to have been small. Wouldn't stockpiles of WMD themselves be massive, as former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook is fond of suggesting?

Actually, no. Why? Stockpiles would normally have been composed of biological or chemical "agents," ready to be inserted into weapons. Take anthrax. The Iraqis admitted they had made 8,500 liters (8.5 tons), and Colin Powell in his February speech to the U.N. Security Council noted that the U.N. inspectors thought Saddam could have about three times as much. But even this larger amount would weigh only some 25 tons in liquid form -- slightly more than one tractor-trailer load. If reduced to powder, as Mr. Powell suggested in his speech, it could be contained in a dozen or so suitcases. Saddam's "stockpile" of biological agent wasn't in his spider hole with him. But it could have been.

Where does this leave the idea of an outside investigation? There are six ongoing investigations in the U.S. -- two in Congress, three in the Executive, and one under Charles A. Duelfer, Mr. Kay's successor. It would seem reasonable

to let them finish before starting a seventh. But to jump ahead in a thought-experiment, how might such an outside review propose correcting the spies' foolishness, assuming it found such?

Take the solution most often proposed -- including by Mr. Kay: Put less emphasis on technical intelligence and more on human collection. Well, suppose that CIA director George Tenet had emphasized human intelligence even more than he does already and had succeeded a year ago in recruiting a batch of Iraqi generals as spies -- an incredible achievement. But then each one had honestly but falsely reported that Saddam had WMD, at specific locations. We would still have an intelligence failure. What Mr. Kay has described as Iraq's "vortex of corruption" seems to have created an intelligence twilight zone. Maybe better human intelligence could have detected that zone and helped foster more skepticism. There are probably a number of things that we will be able to learn from the pre-war history of WMD estimates. But the indignant should give the rest of us a hint about how U.S. intelligence should have proceeded to get to the truth about the Iraqi WMD programs in these circumstances.

What about the Bush administration's alleged knavery?

Mr. Kay dismisses the idea that knavery existed. There is, however, an element of misjudgment within the White House that should be noted. A year ago September it set out a sound policy for the post-Cold War era of rogue dictatorships, terrorism and proliferation of WMD. It said, essentially, that if a terrible dictatorship has both WMD programs and ties to terrorists it may be a candidate for preventive war -- in no small measure because such a regime may supply WMD to terrorists. But in the run-up to the war, instead of equally emphasizing the nature of Saddam's regime with its massive human-rights violations and its ties to terrorist groups, the administration focused almost exclusively on WMD, especially in Mr. Powell's speech to the Security Council.

It has been suggested that bureaucratic compromises drove that decision -- since WMD was the one issue all relevant agencies could agree on. But the history of murder, rape and torture by Saddam's regime is one of the most extraordinary in human history. If one counts the Iranians who died in his war of aggression in the 1980s, he has killed two million people -- about 10 times the number killed by Slobodan Milosovic, with whom the Clinton administration went to war twice in the 1990s on human-rights grounds.

And Iraq's ties with terrorist groups in the '90s are clear. Even if one focuses only on Iraqi ties to Abu Nidal and Ansar-al-Islam, the requirements of the administration's policy would seem to be met. And in the fall of 2002, Mr. Tenet wrote to Congress outlining a decade of connections between Iraq and al Qaeda, including training in poisons, gases and explosives. There was no need to show that Iraq participated in 9/11 or even that it directed al Qaeda in any operations -- describing occasional cooperation of the sort that is well chronicled was quite sufficient. The Baathists and al Qaeda were like two Mafia families -- they hated, insulted and killed one another, but readily cooperated from time to time against a common enemy. Why not say so?

Such a three-part emphasis on human rights, terrorist ties and WMD programs would have been solidly in line with the president's own explicit policy. A three-legged stool is more stable than a one-legged one, but for some reason the administration decided not to make all three parts of its case in justifying the decision to go to war. As a result, its very heavy emphasis on WMD to the exclusion of the other two bases of its strategy has left the administration vulnerable to the failure to find WMD stockpiles. Whoever caused that decision to be made may have succeeded in papering over some bureaucratic feuding, but reaped a political whirlwind.

*Mr. Woolsey, director of Central Intelligence from 1993-95, is a vice president of Booz Allen Hamilton.*

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Time

February 9, 2004

## So Much For The WMD

***America's top weapons sleuth says the intelligence on Iraq's arms was all wrong. TIME reports on how the CIA blew it***

By Michael Duffy, Washington

CIA chief George Tenet was certain David Kay was the best bloodhound to set loose in Iraq last summer to sniff for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Tenet reasoned that if anyone could find the stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological arms on which the Bush Administration had predicated its unprecedented, pre-emptive attack on Saddam Hussein's regime, it was Kay. The Texan had spent 20 years as an international weapons inspector, with several tours in Iraq.

Hard-nosed and fiercely independent, Kay, 63, had a vast network of friends at the Pentagon and the CIA—and among Iraqis in Baghdad. A political conservative, he sent the Bush campaign a check for \$200 not long after Bush began his quest for the G.O.P. presidential nomination in 1999, and he supported a tough line on Saddam. When Tenet tapped Kay as the "ideal person" to lead a 1,400-strong WMD search party last June, Kay sounded neither daunted nor doubtful. "I'm confident," he told NBC, "that we will reach the goal of understanding Iraq's weapons of

mass destruction program, including where weapons are, where weapons may have been moved and the exact status of that program at the time the war commenced."

Ideal is about the last word anyone on Team Bush is using to describe what Kay is saying now. After his Iraq Survey Group spent seven months visiting hundreds of sites, interviewing thousands of Iraqis and sifting through millions of documents, Kay announced last week that it had uncovered no WMD in Iraq and was "highly unlikely" to turn up any in the future.

In two separate turns before Senate committees, Kay politely shredded some of the Administration's most resilient—and repeated—claims of Saddam's vaunted weapons programs, fingered flawed analysis at the CIA and only halfheartedly encouraged his colleagues to keep looking for the mystery arms. "Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong," said Kay. "It is highly unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed militarized chemical and biological weapons there."

Kay's findings were far more sweeping than the Administration had anticipated—and had several unsettling effects. They raised new doubts about the Administration's conduct in the weeks leading up to a war that cost hundreds of American lives and billions of dollars and alienated many allies. They sparked a new round of finger pointing between the CIA and the White House about who ginned up the weapons that apparently never existed—and why. They put new pressure on Tenet, who has survived in his post longer than many might have imagined and may no longer be able to write his own exit lines. And they revived plans, long abandoned, of a badly needed reform of the nation's numerous, mysterious, overlapping and often quarrelsome intelligence agencies. Bush had shelved the idea of a massive, one-time overhaul after 9/11, lest the undertaking distract the nation's spooks from their job of protecting the country from further calamity. But if the resulting work has not been effective, as Kay's findings suggest, there's little reason to put off a fix much longer.

Kay is not the only CIA employee to unload on the agency. Richard Kerr, a former CIA deputy director who just completed an internal review of the Iraq intelligence at Tenet's request, told TIME, "We may have relied too heavily on our prior knowledge and were not as careful as we should [have been]." Kerr spent six months looking at the secret U.S. intelligence on Saddam's WMD, including the crown jewels presented every morning to Bush and his top advisers—the President's daily brief. Kerr said one problem may have been that the CIA tried to distill complex matters too simply in the top-secret brief, with the result that its claims about Saddam's arsenal were not always adequately conditioned and caveated. "You're trying to make an argument—you often are caught up in that," he said. Looking at the Iraq intelligence in general, "you can find places where they're fairly careful and cautious," Kerr told TIME, "and other times where they carried the argument probably farther than they had evidence for ... There can clearly be some improvements."

Tenet may hope Kerr's internal review will take some of the steam out of an even more scathing review, expected this week, by the Senate Intelligence Committee. That panel, controlled by Republicans, has worked for weeks on its own 300-page confidential draft report on the prewar WMD intelligence. Knowledgeable sources tell TIME that the Senate report will probably tag the agency for failing to conduct a zero-based assessment of Saddam's arsenal—that is, a brand-new study with no underlying assumptions about his weapons. Such a review was performed in 1991 before the first Gulf War, but not this time around. The product of 175 interviews by staff members on the panel, the Senate committee report is expected to take particular aim at Tenet, sources said, for giving lawmakers his personal assurance in closed-door hearings that WMD stocks would be found in Iraq. "He was telling the senior people in the Administration," said one source, "that the weapons were absolutely there, that they were certain the stuff was there." Tenet, as a result, "is locked in. He has nowhere to go." A senior intelligence official said Tenet will be perfectly comfortable telling the Senate committee that the Iraq Survey Group is still at work and that it is premature to come to any conclusions about WMD in Iraq.

The impending cascade of critiques from several quarters may have been one reason Kay decided to move so suddenly late last month to put his conclusions on the record: he didn't want to be overshadowed. Kay, after all, had been charged with finding the weapons by Tenet last summer, when the public outcry about the gap between rhetoric and reality first seemed to peak. Instead of hunting for weapons, Kay and his staff set about interviewing Saddam's weapons scientists, engineers and doctors, working in part from U.N.-compiled lists going back several years. The names on Kay's roster ran into the thousands. Some were dead, and some refused to talk, but after the team had spoken to 75% of the experts, Kay was "perplexed that not a single thing had shown up." Kay joked, "Knowing Iraqi efficiency, it seemed hard to believe that they'd scrubbed everything so cleanly. A number of us were getting really concerned."

By late June Kay thought that perhaps Saddam had a modern, just-in-time delivery system for WMD and had been able to dispose of both weapons and raw materials quickly when the U.S. invaded. But then he realized that Saddam wasn't "even that organized." Looking back on it, Kay said, "this wasn't a blinding flash. It was a slow accretion of evidence that was all pointing in the same direction." Kay was struck that he couldn't find any sign of the logistical

network of trucks, drivers and construction workers required of a sophisticated weapons program. "If that stuff doesn't exist," he said, "it means the stuff you're looking for doesn't exist."

Still, Kay's team kept looking. Some agency analysts had predicted that a number of mysterious mobile trailers found in Iraq were for the manufacture of biological weapons. These staff members were shipped out to the field to prove their hunch. Kay reported that several returned deeply upset from the trailers, which, it turned out, were for manufacturing hydrogen for use in weather balloons. "They said to me, 'I'm sorry we can't find what we told you existed,'" Kay recalled. Yet some analysts would not give up the fight. Kay told of a months-long tug-of-war between those back in Washington who believed and those in the field who could see with their own eyes. Kay tried to rotate the former into the field because, as he put it, "the people who stuck to their guns the longest" were the ones who never went to Iraq.

What CIA analysts imagined to be dispositive evidence of Saddam's nuclear ambitions turned out, in Kay's judgment, to be proof of plain, old-fashioned greed. For months the Administration claimed that finely machined aluminum tubes, imported with ever higher tolerances—that is, precision in their specifications—were part of a campaign to produce gas centrifuges for the production of weapons-grade nuclear fuel. But after examining the tubes and talking to the scientists who procured and used them, Kay became convinced that the increasing tolerances were to meet not technical requirements but financial ones. The ever changing tolerances meant new purchases, which in turn meant that the engineers who were working on Saddam's missile programs, for which the tubes were in fact destined, had continuing contracts from which to skim money. Kay concluded, "An analyst looks for rational explanations and usually finds them in the technical realm they're used to, but Iraq was almost like a parallel universe. The explanations were driven not by technical reasons but by the moral and personal depravity engendered by the regime. A rational person would look at it one way, and it would be completely wrong, because in this parallel universe there was a different set of rules."

Tales of machine-shop graft make clear that Saddam had a variety of secret ambitions, and, Kay said repeatedly last week, the Iraqis were doing all kinds of things in violation of international law. But the unspannable gap between the Administration's vast prewar claims and a thin postwar reality has irritated some members of Congress. Democrats complain that they had been duped, and in private some Republicans say they feel the same. Ohio Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican on the Intelligence Committee, told the Columbus Dispatch that he was not sure he would vote to authorize war with Iraq if he had to do it all over again. Others, including John McCain, are calling for a bipartisan investigation of who zoomed whom in the walk-up to the war.

Even when an election is not months away, such probes mean different things to different people. To Democrats, a blue-ribbon panel would discover whether Administration hard-liners shopped around for intelligence that fit their war aims. "The Administration made a conscious decision to cherry-pick the intelligence and to make the most aggressive case possible ... based upon its belief that [ousting Saddam] was the right thing to do," says Indiana's Evan Bayh, a Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. "The caveats were in there from the beginning, but they became increasingly less emphasized and then finally were dropped altogether in public pronouncements ... You have the President and the Vice President and the Secretary of State using words like 'we know'—as opposed to 'we believe'—and 'there can be no doubt.'" Pat Roberts, a Republican Senator from Kansas, whose panel will distribute its secret draft report to committee Republicans and Democrats this week, said the Intelligence Committee should be given a chance to explain the intelligence failings before a commission is considered. Still, some Republicans seem to think some kind of commission is inevitable. "We need to set up a mechanism of some type that reviews our intelligence capability in the world as it is today," says House Intelligence Committee chairman Porter Goss. "It's just a question of the how and the when."

A senior White House official told TIME that Bush might go along with a blue-ribbon panel, though the President wants to let the Iraq Survey Group continue its work. With Kay having resigned his post, the group is now under the leadership of Charles Duelfer, another veteran arms inspector. Bush, the official said, continues to stand by Tenet, in part because foreign intelligence agencies also missed the WMD. Besides, the source added, Bush is "very willing to go out and discuss why [war] was the right thing to do. He is as sure of this as he is of anything."

Kay's tale is a reminder that there is no substitute for on-the-ground human intelligence—the very kind that U.S. spymasters have lacked in Iraq and elsewhere for years. The U.S. overestimated the current WMD program in Iraq, but it underestimated WMD operations in Iraq before the 1991 war and, more recently, in Libya, Iran and perhaps North Korea. The shortfall in humint is everyone's fault. Administrations going back to the mid-1970s have favored more technical means of eavesdropping over sending spies into danger.

For years a bipartisan group of spooks and ex-spooks has advocated overhauling the U.S.'s massive, \$35 billion-a-year intelligence bureaucracy and putting it under a single, all-powerful director, a scheme that has met with ferocious bureaucratic blockades. Kay noted last week that "closed orders and secret societies, whether they be religious or governmental, are the groups that have the hardest time reforming themselves in the face of failure



without outside input." But as U.S. intelligence failures pile up—notably relating to 9/11 and Iraq—it may be that the war on terrorism can't be won until the spy agencies find the courage to change themselves.

*Reported by Timothy J. Burger, Massimo Calabresi, Matthew Cooper, Mark Thompson and Adam Zagorin/Washington*

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040209-586175.00.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

U.S. News & World Report

February 9, 2004

## 'We Were All Wrong'

*The failure to turn up weapons of mass destruction fuels debate over who's to blame*

By Kevin Whitelaw

When it came to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, David Kay used to be a true believer. "Iraq stands in clear violation of international orders to rid itself of these weapons," Kay told *U.S. News* in September 2002, expressing particular fear over Saddam's biological arsenal. Before the war, Pentagon officials seeking to press the case for war would even steer reporters toward Kay—a respected scientist who had once served as a United Nations weapons inspector.

But by the time Kay testified to Congress last week, he had clearly changed his mind. "It turns out we were all wrong," he said in the kind of mea culpa rarely heard in Washington. During his seven months as the CIA's chief weapons sleuth, his team failed to turn up any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. "I think there were no large stockpiles of WMD," he added.

His admission has also reignited a partisan firestorm over who deserves blame. Kay castigated U.S. intelligence agencies—and tried to absolve the Bush administration of accusations that it had politicized the intelligence. The Republican-controlled House and Senate intelligence committees are working on draft reports that offer similar conclusions, putting new pressure on CIA Director George Tenet. "We have a credibility crisis," says Rep. Jane Harman, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee.

Democrats on Capitol Hill are also calling for investigations into whether the Bush administration exaggerated and manipulated the intelligence to bolster its case for war. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence officials, on the defensive, pointed out that Kay has turned up evidence of Iraq's continuing interest in developing WMD—as well as acts of self-deception or bluffing among the Iraqi leadership—while also insisting that the hunt for actual weapons is far from complete.

**Having it both ways?** Many experts are puzzled by Kay's exoneration of the Bush administration. "Kay is trying to have it both ways," says critic Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "He's trying to honestly report what he found and still support the administration's case that it was right to go to war." Some have even questioned the motives of Kay, who in the last four years has given political contributions to both President Bush and the Republican National Committee.

What has been lost in this recent round of finger-pointing is just how much dissent there was inside the intelligence community. Perhaps the most pivotal document was the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons in October 2002. The report, produced in record time, was significantly more conclusive than previous assessments, asserting that Saddam possessed chemical and biological weapons and had probably resumed building nuclear weapons. But the shifts weren't based on new data. "The intelligence community, for the most part, talked about estimates and judgments, rather than solid evidence," says Greg Thielmann, who retired as acting director of the nonproliferation office in the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau as the NIE was being drafted. That office and the Energy Department, in fact, vigorously disputed the NIE's conclusion that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. In all, there were some 40 different caveats and dissents included in the NIE, according to a study by the Carnegie Endowment.

Such nuances were rarely raised publicly by the Bush administration. As late as September, a Defense Intelligence Agency report noted that "there is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling chemical weapons." Yet the previous month, Vice President Cheney left little room for uncertainty: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction." Insiders describe many forms of subtle pressure that the administration applied to analysts. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld even created a special Pentagon office to scrutinize raw data to find evidence to boost the case for war. "Flawed intelligence is just part of the question," says a top U.S. official. "In the midst of this intelligence failure, you had people spinning everything they could to make it even worse."

Iraq, of course, was the hardest kind of intelligence target—an exceptionally opaque regime that went to great lengths to conceal its activities. And, as Kay pointed out in his testimony, just about everybody got it wrong, including



antiwar nations like France and Germany, which also thought that Iraq possessed banned weapons. Kay's critique of the intelligence community's performance is hard to argue with, especially his criticism of the CIA's inability to develop human sources to penetrate Saddam's regime. Instead, analysts were forced to rely heavily on circumstantial evidence, in particular Iraq's efforts to deceive U.S. intelligence and its inability to account for its weapons. Still, in reviewing the intelligence, there was contradictory evidence that analysts simply ignored because it was contrary to their assumptions. "They had various reporting from different sources through time that in retrospect people will say should have raised more questions," says one intelligence official.

**Deception.** Ironically, Kay and others now believe that Iraq may actually have destroyed its WMD arsenal in the 1990s, just as the regime claimed. After years of confronting Saddam's deceit, this is still difficult for many intelligence analysts to accept. "If we had voiced some of these things around the table, we would have been laughed out of the room," says Thielmann.

Another possibility that Kay offered is that Iraqi scientists might have been lying to Saddam, claiming progress to assuage his ambitions. There were hints of such deceit dating back to the Persian Gulf War. Gordon Oehler, the CIA's liaison to the U.N. inspectors at the time, tells *U.S. News* how one top defector tied to the nuclear program described Iraq's dramatic progress in building a bomb, forcing the CIA to revise its estimates. But the CIA soon realized the scientists were simply making it up. "All the people he talked to were lying through their teeth," Oehler says. "[The program] was much bigger than we thought, but it wasn't making more progress than we thought." The intelligence estimate, though, was not revised back.

Wherever the blame ultimately falls, many in Washington fear that U.S. credibility has been damaged in the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation, especially when it comes to countries like North Korea. At the very least, it will impede the Bush administration's new doctrine of pre-emptive war. "If you are going to go on a preventive war, you need to know with a reasonable certainty that they have the weaponry and that you know where it is," says David Isenberg at BASIC, a national security think tank. "What Iraq shows us is that we can't do that currently."

*With Bruce Auster, David E. Kaplan and Mark Mazzetti*

<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/040209/usnews/9wmd.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

London Daily Telegraph

February 2, 2004

## One Terrorist With Deadly Disease 'Could Cause Deaths Of Millions'

By Robert Uhlig, Technology Correspondent

The prospect of a terrorist, self-infected with a deadly disease at a stage before it shows its symptoms, boarding an aeroplane to infect tens or hundreds of other passengers is what risk experts call a "low likelihood, high impact" threat.

Despite sounding as unlikely as the plot of a trashy novel, the threat was considered real enough on Saturday for the American government to refuse security clearances for six flights to America.

It is deemed "low likelihood" because of the difficulty terrorists would face in obtaining or manufacturing a viable biological agent, yet "high impact" because of the ease with which disease would spread in the confined space of an airliner, eventually to infect millions.

The practice of recirculating cabin air to cut fuel costs has already been blamed for spreading colds, flu and gastrointestinal infections that have struck down 200 passengers at once.

Older aircraft such as Concorde and the Boeing 737 relied solely on air ducted from the jet engines for their ventilation. It meant the on-board atmosphere was extremely dry but at least the cabin air was replaced completely every three minutes.

Modern airliners use a 50-50 blend of fresh and old air simply because it is cheaper. Air conditioning units siphon power from the jet engines; less ventilation means lower fuel consumption.

With the increased carbon dioxide levels comes a greater circulation of particles, organisms and disease.

Potentially the biggest threat in these circumstances would be a terrorist infected with smallpox.

A single sneeze would be enough to put hundreds of thousands of saliva droplets carrying the variola virus into circulation, which would be fatal to three out of 10 people not vaccinated against the disease.

Unlike anthrax, smallpox can spread from person to person. It claimed about a billion lives before being declared extinct in 1980. "Smallpox is a very dangerous weapon in the hands of terrorists and you don't need some clever way of delivering it," said Dr Lev Sandakhchiyev, director of Russia's Vektor Institute, which holds one of only two official samples of the extinct disease.

"All you need is a sick fanatic to get to a populated place. The world health system is completely unprepared for this."

A study by Dr Tara O'Toole, of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, gave some indication of the "high impact" potential of a theoretical attack.

A smallpox-infected terrorist who boarded a plane on April 1 would, by mid-June, have led to 15,000 cases and 2,000 deaths in America, while the disease would have spread to at least four other countries.

Another study, by the American government, predicted three million cases and one million deaths within a few months of the first infected patient.

Smallpox is on a list of biological agents "of highest concern" issued by the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. The list includes bubonic or pneumonic plague, which can be passed person to person, tularaemia (an acute infectious disease of rodents transmitted by ticks or flies) and Lassa fever.

Experts believe smallpox, anthrax, botulism and plague are the most likely pathogens to be used.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/02/02/nterr102.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/02/02/ixnewstop.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Newsweek

February 9, 2004

## 'Sanctions Worked'

*The world's atomic watchdog, vindicated in Iraq, confronts the new nuclear landscape*

By Lally Weymouth

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), meant to be the watchdog of the nuclear world, has been shouldered aside by the Bush administration in Iraq and Libya and kicked out of North Korea by Kim Jong Il. Yet now that even Washington admits that Saddam didn't have an active nuclear program, and with the contours of a global black market in nuclear technology coming to light, the agency may soon resume its central role in the fight against nuclear proliferation. In an interview with newsweek's Lally Weymouth, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei discussed the challenges ahead. Excerpts:

**NEWSWEEK: What conclusion do you draw from the fact that Iraq does not seem to have had a sophisticated nuclear program?**

**ELBARADEI:** I think the sanctions worked, and more importantly, the inspections worked. A combination of sanctions and inspections managed to disarm Iraq.

**Do you feel vindicated on Iraq?**

I feel relieved.

**If Saddam didn't have weapons of mass destruction, why didn't he come clean?**

You have to understand the Iraqi system, which was the most centralized, authoritarian regime that ever existed. Nothing was done without [Saddam's] green light or consent. You might argue that he knew that they had nothing and [acted based] on dignity and pride. It could also be that he realized that the war was predetermined, so why add to his humiliation? Before the war, Iraq, at least in our area, was cooperating with us, trying its best to help. But it was too late.

**Would you like to send inspectors back to Iraq?**

Oh, absolutely. We still have a request by the Security Council to verify that Iraq has no nuclear weapons. We are in a very uncomfortable situation because [although] we have the mandate, we are not able to return. I think eventually we'll have to go back, as we are the ones who, frankly, have the credibility to say they do or do not have [a nuclear program] because we are impartial. I am worried because they still have a lot of people with the know-how and the technology. So I'd like to do some ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq for a few years before we say this chapter is closed.

**North Korea says they have a program to process plutonium. What's your sense?**

My gut feeling is that they have a [nuclear] capability. We know that they have spent fuel, which has been reprocessed. They probably have enough plutonium to make a few bombs. That makes [North Korea] the most dangerous proliferation situation. This is a country that is completely beleaguered, isolated, has nothing to lose and has a weapons capability. So continuing to do a Kabuki dance over how to resolve the issue is not helpful. We must find a solution.

**What should be done?**

They are going through a very difficult humanitarian situation. We need to provide them security and humanitarian assistance, and in return make sure that we dismantle their weapons program. The more we offer, the more we [will] get.

**How do you ensure that they don't cheat as they did the last time?**

They cheated the last time because there was no system of verification. So, this time, if there is a settlement, we need to [ensure] comprehensive verification of all nuclear activities to see that they are not cheating.

**There have been reports of the differences between your agency and the Bush administration. Please comment.**

I'm not sure I want to characterize them as differences. In Libya, for example, I believe that we obviously have the mandate under [the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] to do the verification and to do it independently. There was some discussion over the division of labor, but I think that has been accepted now that we are the ones to do the inspection. There might be some differences in perception with regard to Iran. We have said we haven't seen concrete evidence that Iran's program is linked to a weapons program. Some in the American administration say that the Iranian program could only be explained in terms of a weapons program. On Iraq, we sustained the view before the war that we hadn't seen evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapon program, and we [still] haven't seen it today.

**Why does an energy-rich country like Iran need nuclear energy?**

They say it's more economical for them to export oil and gas and rely on nuclear energy. They would like to diversify their source of supply. The suspension is difficult they claim [because] it is their right under the NPT to enrich uranium. [They argue that] they are suspending but should not terminate the program so should they decide to resume, they will be ready. Of course, the West wants to see the program terminated. And Iran has made the enrichment program a jewel in the crown in terms of national pride. After 20 years of sanctions, they managed to do it on their own, so they sold it as a major national achievement.

**British Foreign Minister Jack Straw says Iran is not playing ball on the question of uranium enrichment. But you said recently that it is. What's the case?**

Iran is playing ball. It declared the origin of its program and is cooperating well with us after months of difficulty. We can't say everything we have seen is for peaceful purposes, but we are moving in the right direction. Enrichment activities have been suspended. The problem is how do you define enrichment-related activities? The Iranians would like to continue to manufacture centrifuges and to assemble them under verification. But if you are really suspending, it should be a comprehensive suspension.

**How big was Libya's nuclear program?**

They were at the preparatory stage for developing an enrichment program; but they were getting the equipment. There was a serious program in the making. They were at an early stage, but it was [only] a question of time.

**Do you think multilateral sanctions had an effect on Libya?**

I frankly don't know why Libya switched. I don't know if it was regime preservation or they realized that there was no point to continue confrontation with the West. Maybe they feared that what happened to Iraq might happen to them.

**Where did the Libyans and the Iranians acquire their nuclear technology?**

They were both getting it from the black market—it's a network of suppliers.

**Are states involved in the nuclear technology black market?**

I'm not sure we can say it's state oriented. I think it's a lot of private-sector individuals. The Pakistani government is now investigating some Pakistani scientists.

**Can you actually produce enough fissile material to make a bomb without a government lab?**

That's what we have seen. There are scientists who have the know how to design centrifuges or weapons, for example. They contract a manufacturer in a country that has an industrial infrastructure, and then a recipient country will get ready-made enrichment technology.

**What about terror groups getting nuclear technology?**

They can get their hands on radioactive substances—that's the worry. A Cobalt 60 machine in a hospital, you can make a dirty bomb with these [but] they are not nuclear weapons. They will disseminate radioactivity and will terrorize. [For terrorists to acquire a ] nuclear weapon is still difficult unless they steal a ready-made bomb. It's still quite difficult to enrich uranium or separate plutonium. Difficult but not impossible.

**How would you change the NPT to address this new reality?**

If we believe that WMD coupled with terrorism is the No. 1 security threat, we need to take a fresh look at the regime. It is worth it because the regime is not up to expectations; it has loopholes in terms of inspections and of export controls. For example, we have seen in Libya how sophisticated black-market proliferators operate with an extremely high level of sophistication. Things are designed in one country, manufactured in a couple of others, shipped to a false end user, rediverted to a fifth country—it's really like organized crime in the trade of weapons. That requires revisiting the whole system of export controls. Right now the export-controls system is based on a gentlemen's agreement. We need a system universally subscribed to and treaty based, a legal obligation.

**Under the existing NPT, a member state can enrich plutonium or reprocess spent fuel-two ways to manufacture a nuclear weapon. Must the system change and IAEA be given enhanced powers to prevent countries from getting nuclear weapons programs?**

The NPT started operating over 30 years ago when reprocessing and enrichment appeared to be such sophisticated technologies that not many countries would be able to engage in them. Now any country with an industrial infrastructure can do enrichment-reprocessing. So is the system good enough if you have countries sitting on plutonium or highly enriched uranium which can easily be converted into [nuclear] weapons? There is no need for every country to have enrichment and reprocessing facilities. If they are needed for civilian use [nuclear energy], they should be concentrated in a few centers under multinational control.

**You outlined an ambitious new approach to dealing with the problem of proliferation going beyond what the current NPT does. Could you get international support for this?**

I think we can get a lot of support if the change is perceived to be equitable, which means that the weapons states should commit to move toward nuclear disarmament. You cannot tell everybody, we'll tighten the screws on you while we will continue to develop new weapons. The situation is really coming to a fork in the road. If we continue the way we are going, we will see more nuclear weapons since people see them as a source of power and prestige.

**Washington is more worried about Iran or Pakistan having nuclear weapons than Great Britain. Maybe that's not fair, but that's the reality.**

Put yourself in Iran's or North Korean's shoes. They're also worried about what they hear about regime change, about the axis of evil.

**But they are rogue states.**

I cannot judge them. I do not like people to have nuclear weapons whether they are democracies or not.

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4120339/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

January 31, 2004

## **Timing Of Nuclear Talks Up To N. Korea, U.S. Official Says**

*Armitage, after meeting with Chinese leaders, also questions the logic of Taiwan's referendum.*

By Mark Magnier, Times Staff Writer

BEIJING — The timing of a new round of talks over North Korea's nuclear weapons program is in the hands of the isolated Asian nation, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage said Friday.

"The decision on the dates is in Pyongyang, not in Beijing, so you would have to ask the North Koreans," he told reporters.

Armitage, speaking after a day of meetings with Chinese political and military leaders, said there was no single impediment delaying the North Korea talks. The second round of six-party negotiations, originally set to begin last month, would involve the United States, China, Japan, Russia and North and South Korea.

"I don't know if there's any one particular issue I'd put my finger on as a sticking point," he said. "It's just the general difficulty of herding six of us in the same direction at the same time while simultaneously dealing with what is clearly a legacy of suspicion" in North Korea.

Early this month, North Korea said it was willing to end its nuclear arms program in return for political and economic concessions from the United States.

Armitage added that there was some evidence North Korea's economy was improving, albeit modestly, with recent visitors observing more economic activity in Pyongyang, the capital.

"But whether that extends to the rest of the country is certainly rather doubtful," he said, citing the World Food Program's recent appeal for large quantities of food aid.

Turning to another area of potential instability in East Asia, the diplomat said Washington remained committed to maintaining the status quo between China and Taiwan.

Armitage questioned the reasoning behind a March referendum proposed by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian.

Under the proposal, Taiwanese voters would be asked whether their government should purchase advanced antimissile systems if Beijing refused to dismantle hundreds of ballistic missiles based along the Taiwan Strait and whether the island should try to negotiate a "peace and stability framework" for relations with the mainland.

"As I understand it," Armitage said, "referendums are generally reserved for items that are either very divisive or difficult, and the wording I've seen in the referendum seems to be neither divisive nor difficult."

The administration is still studying the referendum's language and its context, Armitage said, with an eye to the election and its domestic impact.

"You have to ask the leader of Taiwan what he thinks the message is," he said. "There is an election campaign going on. That might have something to do with it."

Beijing views Taiwan as part of China and is critical of the referendum and any move by the island to assert its independence.

In his meetings with Chinese officials, Armitage discussed bilateral relations, global security and the situation in Iraq, in addition to Taiwan and North Korea. North Korea has said it has a nuclear weapon, Armitage said, and should be taken at its word. "I do not think they are" bluffing, he added.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-armitage31jan31.1.2658529.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Boston Globe

February 1, 2004

## N. Korea Gassing Prisoners, BBC Says

LONDON - A program made by Britain's BBC says North Korea is killing political prisoners in experimental gas chambers and testing new chemical weapons on women and children.

Titled "Access to Evil," the program features an official North Korean document that says political prisoners are used to test new chemical weapons.

In a statement, the BBC said the documentary included comments by Kwon Hyuk, a name given to a former military attache at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing and chief of management at Prison Camp 22.

Using a drawing, he describes a gas chamber and the victims he says he saw at the prison in the northeast of the secretive communist state, near the Russian border.

"I witnessed a whole family being tested on suffocating gas and dying in the gas chamber. The parents, son, and a daughter. The parents were vomiting and dying, but 'til the very last moment they tried to save kids by doing mouth-to-mouth breathing," he said.

"Normally, a family sticks together [in the gas chamber] ... and individual prisoners stand separately around the corners. Scientists observe the entire process from above, through the glass."

Asked how he felt about the children, he said: "It would be a total lie for me to say I felt sympathetic about the children dying such a painful death. Under the society and the regime I was in at the time, I only felt that they were the enemies.

"So I felt no sympathy or pity for them at all."

The documentary is for the BBC's "This World" series.

North Korean officials in London were unavailable to comment. BBC journalist Olenka Frenkiel said she had three independent confirmations that Kwon Hyuk was genuine.

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

BBC News UK Edition

Thursday, 29 January, 2004, 10:24 GMT

## Access to Evil

**North Korea remains isolated and in fear of an Iraq-style invasion from the United States. International crisis talks continue over the regime's nuclear weapons programme.**

**But This World has uncovered evidence of another more chilling evil: that North Korea is testing new chemical weapons on women and children.**

Hundreds of thousands of people are imprisoned without charge. It's not because they have committed a crime. It is because their relatives are believed to be critical of the regime and so they are punished.

According to President Kim Jong Il, the bad blood and seed of any dissident must be rooted out down to three generations.

Forced labour and starvation rations ensure that prisoners do not escape. Those who try to are publicly executed. But this is not the North Korea the government wants the world to see. The authorities go to great lengths to equip all foreign intruders with "minders" and monitor their every move.

The This World team were scrupulously guarded. The answers could only be found outside North Korea itself.

Reporter, Olenka Frenkiel, hears testimonies from victims of the secret camps who have since fled to South Korea or the United States. And most shocking of all, she tracks down one of the perpetrators.

Kwon Hyok, a former North Korean army intelligence officer, was also chief guard at "Prison Camp no. 22". For the first time on camera, he describes specially-made glass gas chambers used for human experimentation.

This World asks: if a deal is reached with North Korea about its nuclear weapons, should it be allowed to keep their gas chambers?

**Access to Evil was broadcast in the UK on Sunday, 1 February, 2004 at 2100 on BBC Two.**

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/this\\_world/3436701.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/this_world/3436701.stm)

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

London Sunday Telegraph

February 1, 2004

## **'I Saw An Entire Family Being Killed. They Were Put In The Gas Chamber Where They All Suffocated. The Last To Die Was The Youngest Son'**

*Kwon Hyok, a former North Korean intelligence agent, was persuaded to defect to the South. Olenka Frenkiel reports on the horrors he saw in the camp where he worked*

Kwon Hyok makes an unlikely defector. His flat cap and three-piece herringbone suit hangs ridiculously on his thin body. He looks like a cartoon character ready for a game of golf.

The 45-year-old is one of about 4,000 North Koreans who have left their country and now live in South Korea's capital, Seoul. They are generally called "defectors" but most are simply "escapers" who have been lucky enough to make it. Most who embark on the journey from North Korea across the Tumen river to China get stuck on the way. The Chinese are all too willing to send them back, if caught, to North Korea's prisons, and sometimes death.

Kwon Hyok, however, had it easy. There was no arduous two-year trek for him through China, Mongolia and Laos, hiding, pretending and bribing the authorities. He was a North Korean intelligence agent stationed in Beijing and was turned by his South Korean counterparts. He was persuaded to defect. Today, the South Korean taxpayer looks after him and, in return, he advises the government in Seoul on how to deal with the new enemy, the North.

The other North Koreans I met living in Seoul were victims of their old regime. I listened to their dreadful experiences of starvation, cannibalism, torture and murder, and wondered how such brutality could exist.

It was Kwon Hyok who helped to answer my question. He says that in 1993 he was the head of security at Prison Camp 22 in the north-east of the country. It is one of a network of prisons in North Korea modelled on the Soviet Union's Gulag. Most of the prisoners have been charged with no crime. They are there because of the "Heredity Rule".

Kwon Hyok explained: "In North Korea political prisoners are those who say or do something against the dead President Kim Il Sung, or his son Kim Jong Il. But they also include a wide network of next of kin."

Prison camps are filled with relatives of offenders: grandparents, children, brothers, aunts, all arrested for one person's false move and who often have no idea why. Kwon Hyok said: "There is a watchdog system in place between members of five different families. So if I were caught trying to escape, then not just my family members but all of the rest of the four neighbouring families are shot out of collective responsibility." In this way families are forced to spy on each other.

Camp 22, he said, is "surrounded by a 3,300-volt electric fence and, inside the fence, is a 10-metre moat with spikes sticking out to impale anyone attempting escape".

Torture, he said, was routine. "Prisoners were like pigs or dogs. You could kill them without caring whether they lived or died."

He described water torture, hanging torture, the box-room torture. And he described how he ordered public executions in the camp, and not just of those who tried to escape, but of their entire families and the families of their neighbours.

"Once," he said, "I killed 31 people, all members of five families." For the first three years you enjoy torturing people but then it wears off and someone else takes over. But most of the time you do it because you enjoy it."

Kwon Hyok, however, had something else he wanted to tell. He has been in Seoul for almost five years but he has never spoken publicly of what he says he saw in a secret, restricted area of Camp 22.

He said that he witnessed chemical experiments being carried out on political prisoners in specially constructed chambers hidden in the camp. Various different gases, he claimed are being tested there including one he called Vinyla - related to the North Korean artificial fibre Vinalon. He described the chambers - glass rooms within a room - sealed and with a ventilation shaft that pumps gas inside. Above, there is a viewing gallery where, North Korean scientists observe the death throes of their victims.

"The most unforgettable scene I remember was when I watched an entire family being killed. They were put inside the chamber and I saw them all suffocate to death. The last person to die was the youngest son who was crying for his parents and eventually died."



Kwon Hyok said that the youngest victims were children and the eldest were in their sixties. They were selected by others and brought to the chamber where they were stripped naked and given a medical. They had to be checked free of disease before entering.

He drew the layout for me explaining that individual victims stand around the edges of the chamber while families collect in the centre clinging together. "Even though they were dying," he said, "I saw the parents trying to save their children by giving them mouth-to-mouth resuscitation."

"How did you feel when you saw the children die?" I asked. "I had no sympathy at all because I was taught to think that they were all enemies of our country and that all our country's problems were their fault. So I felt they deserved to die."

I listened to his cold and logical testimony remembering the phrase "the banality of evil". His words lacked emotion. He appeared to feel no remorse. He seemed proud that he had earned promotion in the army on the strength of his cold-blooded ruthlessness.

There have been many rumours of human experimentation on political prisoners in North Korea, but never has anyone offered documentary proof. Until now. In Seoul I met Kim Sang Hun, a distinguished human rights activist. He showed me four documents that he told me had recently been snatched illicitly from Camp 22.

They were headed Letter of Transfer, marked Top Secret and dated February 2002. They each bore the name of a male victim; his date and place of birth. The text read: "The above person is transferred from Camp 22 for the purpose of human experimentation with liquid gas for chemical weapons."

The location was named: Vinalon Plant 2.8. There was a North Korean stamp saying Prison Camp 22.

Kim Hang Sun was convinced that this was not a forgery. The paper, the handwriting, the bureaucratic format, the official stamps and the document's provenance all convinced him that it was authentic.

I took one of the documents to a Korean specialist in London who examined it and confirmed that there was nothing to suggest that it was a forgery. I wanted to run a check of my own with Kwon Hyok. Without showing him the Letter of Transfer, I asked him, without prompting him in any way: "How were the victims selected when they went for human experimentation? Was there some bureaucracy, some paperwork?"

"When we escorted them to the site we would receive a Letter of Transfer," he said.

Kim Hang Sun had two explanations for why Kwon Hyok seemed so lacking in emotion. First, they are damaged people, he said, brought up in a perverted value system. But second, he said that many defectors bring stories of chemical weapons experiments in North Korea and they are always surprised at the shocked reaction. In North Korea, they claim, it's common knowledge. They are surprised that we're surprised.

*\*Olenka Frenkiel and Ewa Ewart's report - Access to Evil (This World) - will be shown at 9pm on Saturday night, BBC2*

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2004%2F02%2F01%2Fwnkor01.xml>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

## Revealed: the gas chamber horror of North Korea's gulag

A series of shocking personal testimonies is now shedding light on Camp 22 - one of the country's most horrific secrets

**Antony Barnett**

**Sunday February 1, 2004**

[The Observer](#)

In the remote north-eastern corner of North Korea, close to the border of Russia and China, is Haengyong. Hidden away in the mountains, this remote town is home to Camp 22 - North Korea's largest concentration camp, where thousands of men, women and children accused of political crimes are held.

Now, it is claimed, it is also where thousands die each year and where prison guards stamp on the necks of babies born to prisoners to kill them.

Over the past year harrowing first-hand testimonies from North Korean defectors have detailed execution and torture, and now chilling evidence has emerged that the walls of Camp 22 hide an even more evil secret: gas chambers where horrific chemical experiments are conducted on human beings.

Witnesses have described watching entire families being put in glass chambers and gassed. They are left to an agonising death while scientists take notes. The allegations offer the most shocking glimpse so far of Kim Jong-il's North Korean regime.

Kwon Hyuk, who has changed his name, was the former military attaché at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing. He was also the chief of management at Camp 22. In the BBC's This World documentary, to be broadcast tonight, Hyuk claims he now wants the world to know what is happening.



'I witnessed a whole family being tested on suffocating gas and dying in the gas chamber,' he said. 'The parents, son and a daughter. The parents were vomiting and dying, but till the very last moment they tried to save kids by doing mouth-to-mouth breathing.'

Hyuk has drawn detailed diagrams of the gas chamber he saw. He said: 'The glass chamber is sealed airtight. It is 3.5 metres wide, 3m long and 2.2m high\_ [There] is the injection tube going through the unit. Normally, a family sticks together and individual prisoners stand separately around the corners. Scientists observe the entire process from above, through the glass.'

He explains how he had believed this treatment was justified. 'At the time I felt that they thoroughly deserved such a death. Because all of us were led to believe that all the bad things that were happening to North Korea were their fault; that we were poor, divided and not making progress as a country.'

'It would be a total lie for me to say I feel sympathetic about the children dying such a painful death. Under the society and the regime I was in at the time, I only felt that they were the enemies. So I felt no sympathy or pity for them at all.'

His testimony is backed up by Soon Ok-lee, who was imprisoned for seven years. 'An officer ordered me to select 50 healthy female prisoners,' she said. 'One of the guards handed me a basket full of soaked cabbage, told me not to eat it but to give it to the 50 women. I gave them out and heard a scream from those who had eaten them. They were all screaming and vomiting blood. All who ate the cabbage leaves started violently vomiting blood and screaming with pain. It was hell. In less than 20 minutes they were quite dead.'

Defectors have smuggled out documents that appear to reveal how methodical the chemical experiments were. One stamped 'top secret' and 'transfer letter' is dated February 2002. The name of the victim was Lin Hun-hwa. He was 39. The text reads: 'The above person is transferred from ... camp number 22 for the purpose of human experimentation of liquid gas for chemical weapons.'

Kim Sang-hun, a North Korean human rights worker, says the document is genuine. He said: 'It carries a North Korean format, the quality of paper is North Korean and it has an official stamp of agencies involved with this human experimentation. A stamp they cannot deny. And it carries names of the victim and where and why and how these people were experimented [on].'

The number of prisoners held in the North Korean gulag is not known: one estimate is 200,000, held in 12 or more centres. Camp 22 is thought to hold 50,000.

Most are imprisoned because their relatives are believed to be critical of the regime. Many are Christians, a religion believed by Kim Jong-il to be one of the greatest threats to his power. According to the dictator, not only is a suspected dissident arrested but also three generations of his family are imprisoned, to root out the bad blood and seed of dissent.

With North Korea trying to win concessions in return for axing its nuclear programme, campaigners want human rights to be a part of any deal. Richard Spring, Tory foreign affairs spokesman, is pushing for a House of Commons debate on human rights in North Korea.

'The situation is absolutely horrific,' Spring said. 'It is totally unacceptable by any norms of civilised society. It makes it even more urgent to convince the North Koreans that procuring weapons of mass destruction must end, not only for the security of the region but for the good of their own population.'

Mervyn Thomas, chief executive of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, said: 'For too long the horrendous suffering of the people of North Korea, especially those imprisoned in unspeakably barbaric prison camps, has been met with silence ... It is imperative that the international community does not continue to turn a blind eye to these atrocities which should weigh heavily on the world's conscience.'

•This World is being broadcast on BBC2 at 9pm tonight.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/korea/article/0,2763,1136483,00.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Baltimore Sun

February 1, 2004

## **Russia Plans Nuclear Forces Exercise**

*Maneuvers expected to simulate all-out war*

By Associated Press

MOSCOW - Russia's nuclear forces reportedly are preparing their largest maneuvers in two decades, an exercise involving the test-firing of missiles and flights by dozens of bombers in a simulation of an all-out nuclear war.

President Vladimir V. Putin is expected to personally oversee the maneuvers, which are apparently aimed at demonstrating the revival of the nation's military might and come ahead of Russian elections next month.

The business newspaper Kommersant said the exercise was set for mid-February and would closely resemble a 1982 Soviet exercise dubbed the "seven-hour nuclear war" that put the West on edge.

Official comments on the coming exercise have been sketchy. The chief of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, was quoted by the Interfax-Military News Agency as saying the planned maneuvers would involve several launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles in various regions of Russia, but he wouldn't give further details.

A Defense Ministry spokesman refused to comment on the reports. The Russian military typically says little about coming exercises. Kommersant said the maneuvers would involve Tu-160 strategic bombers test-firing cruise missiles over the northern Atlantic. Analysts describe such an exercise as an imitation of a nuclear attack on the United States.

Other groups of bombers will fly over Russia's Arctic regions and test-fire missiles at a southern range near the Caspian Sea, the newspaper said.

As part of the exercise, the military is planning to conduct several launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including one from a Russian nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea, the Kommersant report said.

The military also plans to launch military satellites from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan and the Plesetsk launch pad in northern Russia - a simulation of the replacement of satellites lost in action, Kommersant said.

Russia's system warning of an enemy missile attack and a missile defense system protecting Moscow also will be involved in the exercise, it added.

Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent military analyst, said the military has regularly held nuclear exercises that were timed to coincide with the annual test-firing of aging Soviet-built missiles.

"It has been a routine affair, but it can be expanded if they want a show," he said.

Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow office of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based think tank, said the maneuvers would further strengthen Putin's popularity ahead of the March 14 presidential election he is expected to win easily.

Putin has repeatedly pledged to rebuild Russia's military might and restore pride to the demoralized service. When he ran for his first term in 2000, he flew as a second pilot in a fighter jet and later donned naval officer's garb on a visit to a nuclear submarine - images that played well with many voters who are nostalgic for Soviet global power and military prestige.

"This exercise will make a great show, with Putin receiving reports from military commanders," Safranchuk told the Associated Press.

Kommersant said Moscow had notified Washington about the exercise, describing it as part of efforts to fend off terror threats even though it imitates the Cold War scenario of an all-out war.

"The exercise follows the old scenario, and casting it as anti-terror is absurd," Safranchuk said.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/nationworld/bal-te.russia01feb01.0.1166107.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Moscow Times

February 2, 2004

Pg. 3

## **Bolton Hails Talks On WMD Security**

By Anneli Nerman, Associated Press

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said Friday that Moscow's response to a new initiative aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction was encouraging.

Bolton, ending a two-day visit in Moscow, has been lobbying for support for U.S. President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative, a multilateral effort to increase the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction on the ground, in the air and at sea. The Russian government is fully supportive of the objectives of PSI in reducing trafficking in weapons-related materials, Bolton said after talks with top officials from the armed forces' General Staff.

"We think Russia brings a lot of advantages to the table in terms of its assets in intelligence, law enforcement, military terms, which would help make PSI more effective," he said.

Moscow has not yet agreed to join, saying several questions remain, including whether it is in the national interest and whether it conforms to international law. "The explanation given by U.S. officials did not fully satisfy Russian officials," an anonymous Defense Ministry official said, Itar-Tass reported.

Bolton left the door open for further cooperation even if Moscow refuses to join PSI as a full-fledged member, and said he had fairly extensive discussions with Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev regarding Russia's

participation in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, which Washington fears could aid Iran's nuclear weapons program.

The status of discussions between Tehran and Moscow about the supply and return of fuel for the reactor was also discussed, he said, declining to give more detail. Russia has said it will not ship nuclear fuel to Iran until the two countries sign an agreement under which all spent fuel would be returned to Russia -- a measure aimed to prevent it from being used for making weapons.

The signing has been delayed repeatedly because of disagreements that both Russian and Iranian officials have described as technical. However, a U.S. diplomat suggested Friday that Russia was stalling or, as he put it, being "very prudent" about sending the fuel.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the diplomat noted that up to 1 1/2 years ago, Moscow had denied that Iran was seeking a nuclear weapons potential. Now Russian officials say "we don't know," he said.

Facing growing international pressure to open up its nuclear program to closer international scrutiny, Tehran signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency last month allowing the nuclear agency watchdog full access to its nuclear facilities to ensure they are not being used to develop weapons.

<http://www.sunspot.net/news/nationworld/bal-te.russia01feb01,0,1166107.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

02 Feb 2004 14:59:43 GMT

## **Chemical disarmament body to start work in Libya**

AMSTERDAM, Feb 2 (Reuters) - A global chemical disarmament body said on Monday it would start work in Libya this week to ensure Tripoli's compliance with a chemical weapons ban.

A six-member team from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will begin preparatory work in Libya on Thursday, paving the way for inspectors to eventually visit sites and secure any chemical weapons prior to destruction.

Libya said in December it would abandon weapons of mass destruction programmes and open its territory to international weapons inspectors. It signed up to a chemical weapons ban convention in January.

Although the OPCW is not a U.N. agency, the United Nations recognises the results of its inspections, which are expected to start in Libya from around March.

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear watchdog, joined U.S. and British weapons experts in Libya last month to begin dismantling its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L02150147.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

February 3, 2004

Pg. 1

## **Powell Says New Data May Have Affected War Decision**

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said yesterday that he does not know whether he would have recommended an invasion of Iraq if he had been told it had no stockpiles of banned weapons, even as he offered a broad defense of the Bush administration's decision to go to war.

Even without possessing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein intended to acquire them and tried to maintain the capability of producing them in case international sanctions were lifted, Powell said in an interview. But he conceded that the administration's conviction that Hussein already had such weapons had made the case for war more urgent.

Asked if he would have recommended an invasion knowing Iraq had no prohibited weapons, Powell replied: "I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world." He said the "absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the answer you get."

Powell spoke on the Iraq weapons issue for more than half of the hour-long interview. Throughout the discussion, Powell tried to balance the administration's rationale for going to war with the reality that no weapons of mass destruction have been uncovered in Iraq. Former chief U.S. weapons inspectors David Kay told Congress last week that Hussein did not have such weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion.

Nonetheless, Powell said, history will ultimately judge that the war "was the right thing to do."

Powell is widely perceived to have placed his credibility on the line last Feb. 5 when he appeared before the United Nations Security Council and offered a forceful and detailed description of the U.S. case that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. In that appearance, Powell told the council: "What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."

In the interview yesterday, Powell said he had "spent much of the weekend" reading Kay's testimony last week before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Powell came to the interview, held at The Washington Post, with an annotated and highlighted transcript, and suggested that Kay's testimony was more supportive of the administration than many news accounts have portrayed.

Kay "did say, with respect to stockpiles, we were wrong, terribly wrong," Powell said, flipping through the pages of Kay's transcript and quoting from selected sections. "But he also came to other conclusions that deal, I think, with intent and capability which resulted in a threat the president felt he had to respond to."

Powell said, "Saddam Hussein and his regime clearly had the intent -- they never lost it -- an intent that manifested itself many years ago when they actually used such horrible weapons against their enemies in Iran and against their own people."

That intent, Powell said, was also demonstrated by Hussein keeping in place the capability to produce weapons. He said Hussein continued to train and employ people who knew how to develop weapons, "and there's no question about that and there's nobody debating that part of the intelligence."

Moreover, Powell said, Iraq continued to have the "technical infrastructure, labs and facilities, that will lend themselves to the production of weapons of mass destruction." Such facilities "could produce such weapons at a moment in time, now or some future moment in time," Powell said. "I think there's evidence that suggests that he was keeping a warm base, that there was an intent on his part to have that capability."

Powell asserted that Hussein was intent on creating delivery systems, such as longer-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

"If you look at my presentation from last year, I talk about intent," Powell said. "I talk about the capability I think is there, the stockpiles, but a large part of the presentation is also what happened" and the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons holdings. "He got a chance to answer the questions and he didn't answer the questions."

Powell noted that when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.S. troops expected to be hit with chemical weapons. "We weren't hit with chemical weapons but we found chemical weapons," he said. "So it wasn't as if this was a figment of someone's imagination."

Thus, with U.N. inspectors absent from Iraq for four years, "I think the assumption to make and the assumption we came to, based on what the intelligence community gave to us, was that there were stockpiles present."

Although Kay found the years of sanctions had constrained Hussein, eventually international resolve would have weakened, Powell said.

"I think that the international community wouldn't have kept them constrained," he said. "There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that if Iraq had gotten free of the constraints and if we had gone through another year of desultory action on the part of the United Nations and when they were freed without threat . . . they would have gone to the next level and reproduced these weapons."

Powell said his Feb. 5 presentation, which contained detailed assertions about Iraq's possible weapons stockpiles, "reflected the best judgments of all of the intelligence agencies. . . . There wasn't a word that was in the presentation that was put in that was not totally cleared by the intelligence community."

Powell noted that not only the CIA but other intelligence agencies and the United Kingdom "suggested that the stockpiles were there."

Asked whether the American public should be reassured that so many intelligence agencies were so wrong, Powell replied: "I think it should be reassuring to the voters of the United States that we found a regime that's clearly demonstrated intent and clearly had the capability, and that the president had the information from the intelligence community."

Powell added that the American people will understand "with that body of evidence, that was the information and intelligence that was available to the president at that time, the president made a prudent decision."

Powell added he had faith in the intelligence analysts, who he said gave "their best advice."

"I have confidence in the intelligence community," Powell said. "I've seen them do many things that were absolutely brilliant in their concept and their execution, many things we'll never be able to discuss and will never get a headline." With a twinkle in his eye, he added: "Very recently, as a matter of fact. Go research that if you wish."

### **'The Right Thing To Do'**

Excerpts from an interview yesterday with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell by Washington Post reporters and editors.

**Question:** Do you still feel confident that military invasion [of Iraq] was the right thing to do?

**Powell:** Yes, I think it was the right thing to do, and I think history will demonstrate that. . . . Let me just go right into kind of the issue of the day, which is weapons of mass destruction. . . .

What was the threat that we talked about [before the war] with respect to weapons of mass destruction? And to talk about a threat, you have to look at the intent and you have to look at capabilities, and two of them together equals a threat.

And with respect to intent, Saddam Hussein and his regime clearly had the intent -- they never lost it -- an intent that manifested itself many years ago when they actually used such horrible weapons against their enemies in Iran and against their own people. That's a fact and that's a statement of his intent. . . .

There are different levels of capability. One level is that you have the intellectual ability, you have people who know how to develop such weapons and you keep training such people and you keep them in place and you keep them working together. He did. . . . And also you keep in place the kind of technical infrastructure, labs and facilities. . . . Did he do that? Yes, he did that.

And then the final level of capability is the one that's started getting all the attention now, is: Did it all come together and produce for everybody to see and be afraid of, an actual stockpile over there? And that is what is at question and that is what we have not found and that is what the various committees will be looking at. . . .

A lot has been said about [former U.S. weapons inspector David] Kay . . . and he did say, with respect to stockpiles, we were wrong, terribly wrong. . . . But he also came to other conclusions that deal, I think, with the intent and with capability which resulted in a threat the president felt he had to respond to. . . .

And there is no doubt in my mind that if Iraq had gotten free of the [United Nations] constraints and if we had gone through another year of desultory action on the part of the United Nations . . . there's no doubt in my mind that intention and capability was married up . . . and they would have gone to the next level and reproduced these weapons. Why wouldn't they? That was always [Hussein's] intention.

**Question:** If CIA Director George Tenet had said a year ago today, if U.S. weapons inspector David Kay had said, that there are no stockpiles, would you still have recommended the invasion?

**Powell:** I don't know. I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world. But the fact of the matter is the considered judgment of the intelligence community, represented by George Tenet, and also independently by the United Kingdom and other intelligence agencies, suggested that the stockpiles were there. I can't go back and give you the hypothetical as to what I might have done.

**Question:** But the absence of the stockpiles . . . .

**Powell:** The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus. It changes the answer you get, the formula I laid out. But the fact of the matter is that we went into this with the understanding that there was a stockpile and there were weapons, and for my own personal perspective, you know, I was the chairman for the first Gulf War, and we went in expecting to be hit with chemical weapons. We weren't hit with chemical weapons, but we found chemical weapons. And so it wasn't as if this was a figment of someone's imagination. . . . And so what assumption would one make some nine years after the inspectors had been moved, had been gone for four years? I think the assumption to make and the assumption that we came to, based on what the intelligence community gave to us, was that there were stockpiles present.

**Question:** When you went over to the [CIA] to get more information about the things you were going to say to the United Nations [in a speech in February 2003], did you, as we have heard, push them to tell you what their sources for the conclusions were? . . . When you look back on that experience, did you push hard enough? Did you get, do you think, forthright answers?

**Powell:** [In meetings with intelligence officials] what I wanted to know is what information could I present that you guys feel comfortable to declassify and that you will give me sources and methods on, and that you're absolutely sure was multi-sourced, because I didn't want to put something out that would be shot down later, or that same afternoon, by some other intelligence agency or by the Iraqis. And so we really went through it. And I only used that information that I was confident the [Central Intelligence] Agency stood behind. . . . It was multi-sourced, and it reflected the best judgments of all of the intelligence agencies that spent that four days out there with me. And there wasn't a word that was in that presentation that was put in that was not totally cleared by the intelligence community.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6995-2004Feb2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

February 3, 2004

## Nuclear Talks To Resume, North Korea Says

By Reuters

TOKYO, Tuesday, Feb. 3 — North Korea said Tuesday that the next round of talks on its nuclear program would resume Feb. 25.

The North's state-run Korean Central News Agency said the United States, North Korea and other major parties concerned had agreed to the date after a series of discussions. A round of talks involving North and South Korea, the United States, China, Japan and Russia was held in Beijing in August, but ended inconclusively.

Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, who has been active in previous talks, met Monday with South Korea's unification minister, Jeong Se Hyun, and its foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon.

The dispute over North Korea's nuclear program erupted in October 2002 when American officials said North Korea had admitted to pursuing a clandestine weapons program.

The United States wants the North, at least by the end of the next round of talks, to commit to dismantling any weapons programs. Washington has offered to give details then on security guarantees for the North.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03/international/asia/03KORE.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

February 3, 2004

Pg. 13

## **Musharraf Named In Nuclear Probe**

*Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says*

By John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, Washington Post Foreign Service

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Feb. 2 -- Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has told investigators that he helped North Korea design and equip facilities for making weapons-grade uranium with the knowledge of senior military commanders, including Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, according to a friend of Khan's and a senior Pakistani investigator.

Khan also has told investigators that Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the Pakistani army chief of staff from 1988 to 1991, was aware of assistance Khan was providing to Iran's nuclear program and that two other army chiefs, in addition to Musharraf, knew and approved of his efforts on behalf of North Korea, the same individuals said Monday.

Khan's assertions of high-level army involvement came in the course of a two-month probe into allegations that he and other Pakistani nuclear scientists made millions of dollars from the sale of equipment and expertise to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

They contradict repeated contentions by Musharraf and other senior officials that Khan and at least one other scientist, Mohammed Farooq, acted out of greed and in violation of long-standing government policy that bars the export of nuclear weapons technology to any foreign country.

In conversations with investigators, Khan urged them to question the former army commanders and Musharraf, asserting that "no debriefing is complete unless you bring every one of them here and debrief us together," according to the friend, who has met with the accused scientist twice during the past two months.

On the basis of Khan's claims, Beg and another former army chief of staff, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, who occupied the post from 1996 to 1998, have been questioned by investigators in recent days, but both have denied any knowledge of the transactions, according to a senior Pakistani military officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Gen. Shaukat Sultan, Pakistan's chief military spokesman, declined to comment on the specifics of the allegations but asserted that "General Pervez Musharraf neither authorized such transfers nor was involved in any way with such deeds, even before he was president." Beg and Karamat could not be reached for comment Monday night.

Khan and other senior scientists and officials at the Khan Research Laboratories, the uranium-enrichment facility Khan founded in 1976, have been under investigation since November, when the International Atomic Energy Agency presented Pakistan with evidence that its centrifuge designs had turned up in Iran. The flamboyant European-trained metallurgist, who is 67, became a national hero in Pakistan after the country detonated its first nuclear device in 1998.

In a briefing for Pakistani journalists late Sunday night, a senior Pakistani military officer said that Khan had signed a 12-page confession on Friday in which he admitted to providing Iran, Libya and North Korea with technical assistance and components for making high-speed centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium, a key ingredient for a nuclear bomb.

Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, commander of Pakistan's Strategic Planning and Development Cell, described Khan as the mastermind of an elaborate and wholly unauthorized smuggling network involving chartered cargo flights, clandestine overseas meetings and a Malaysian factory that reconditioned centrifuge parts discarded from Pakistan's nuclear program for sale to foreign clients, according to a journalist who attended Kidwai's 2 1/2-hour briefing.



The technology transfers began in 1989 and were brokered by a network of middlemen, including three German businessmen and a Sri Lankan, identified only as Tahir, who is in custody in Malaysia, Kidwai told the journalists. According to Kidwai's account, Khan told investigators that he supplied materials and assistance to Iran, Libya and North Korea not to make money but to deflect attention from Pakistan's nuclear program and -- in the case of Iran and Libya -- as a gesture of support to other Muslim countries.

The senior Pakistani investigator and a senior intelligence official said Monday that Khan also said he supplied Iran and Libya with surplus, outmoded equipment from the laboratory that he knew would not provide either country with any near-term capability to enrich uranium.

"Dr. Khan is basically contesting the merit of the nuclear proliferation charges," the investigator said. "Throughout his debriefing, Dr. Khan kept challenging the perception that material found from the Libyan or Iranian programs would allow them to enrich uranium."

Investigators contend that Khan accumulated millions of dollars in the course of a 30-year career as a government scientist, investing some of it in real estate in Pakistan and abroad. Kidwai told Pakistani journalists that investigators had reached no conclusions about the source of Khan's wealth, but he acknowledged that Khan's lavish lifestyle was "the worst-kept secret in town" and should have triggered suspicions among those responsible for protecting Pakistan's nuclear secrets, according to a journalist who attended the briefing.

Kidwai "admitted to oversight and intelligence failure," the journalist said.

Kidwai avoided any suggestion of complicity on the part of senior military commanders, including Musharraf, who has maintained throughout the investigation that any transfer of nuclear technology abroad was the work of individuals driven by greed.

By all accounts, Khan ran the laboratory at Kahuta, about 20 miles from Islamabad, with scant oversight from either civilian or military-led governments eager to achieve nuclear parity with arch-rival India.

The military was ultimately responsible for the facility, where security was overseen by two army brigadiers and a special detachment from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). And Khan is said to have insisted during his sessions with investigators that senior military commanders were well aware of his efforts to help other countries with their nuclear programs.

The senior Pakistani investigator said that Beg was "in the picture" regarding Khan's assistance to Iran, but said the former army chief of staff was "probably . . . under the impression that material and knowledge being transferred to Iran would not enable them to produce enriched uranium" because of Khan's claim that he was withholding top-of-the-line equipment. Investigators have found evidence that Khan informed Beg of the transfer of outdated hardware from his laboratory to Iran in early 1991, the official said.

Khan told two generals who jointly questioned him last month that three army chiefs of staff, including Musharraf, had known of his dealings with North Korea, according to the friend of the scientist. "Throughout his debriefing, Dr. Khan kept asking the generals why he was not being asked specific questions about the material he passed on to the North Koreans," the friend said.

U.S. officials have long suspected that Pakistan supplied uranium enrichment technology to North Korea in exchange for help with its ballistic missile program, and that Khan acted as the principal agent of the arrangement. After stating in 2002 that it had a program for enriching uranium for use in weapons, North Korea more recently has denied it.

A retired Pakistani army corps commander said Monday that the barter arrangement dates to December 1994, when then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto traveled to North Korea at the request of Gen. Abdul Waheed, the army chief of staff at the time. A few months later, Khan led a delegation of scientists and military officers to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, according to the retired general and a senior active duty officer, both of whom spoke on condition of anonymity. Musharraf was serving at the time as Waheed's director general for military operations.

In January 1996, Waheed was replaced as chief of staff by Karamat, who secretly visited North Korea in December 1997, according to the retired corps commander. Four months after the trip, in April 1998, Karamat presided over the successful test-firing of a medium-range missile the Pakistanis called a Ghauri. According to U.S. intelligence officials and a former Pakistani nuclear scientist, the Ghauri was simply a renamed North Korean-supplied Nodong missile. Pakistani officials maintain publicly that the Ghauri missile is indigenous to Pakistan.

The senior investigator said Khan claimed that Karamat was privy to the details of the barter arrangement through which Pakistan received the missile, and that Khan had insisted that Karamat's role also be examined.

Khan also has asserted that Musharraf had to have been aware of the agreement with North Korea because Musharraf took over responsibility for the Ghauri missile program when he became army chief of staff in October 1998, according to the scientist's friend and the senior investigator.

According to Kidwai's account to journalists, senior military commanders did not get wind of Khan's nuclear dealings with North Korea until 2000, when the ISI conducted a raid on an aircraft that the laboratory had chartered for a planned flight to North Korea. Although a search of the aircraft turned up no evidence, authorities were



sufficiently concerned that they warned Khan against pursuing any clandestine trade with North Korea, Kidwai told the journalists.

That concern deepened, according to Kidwai's account, after U.S. officials in 2002 and early 2003 presented evidence that Pakistani nuclear technology may indeed have found its way to North Korea.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6884-2004Feb2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The New York Times

## **Blair Sets Up Inquiry on Prewar Iraq Intelligence**

By **PATRICK E. TYLER**

Published: February 3, 2004

LONDON, Feb. 3 — Prime Minister Tony Blair announced today that he had set up an inquiry into the prewar intelligence on Iraq's illicit weapons, but he added that the committee will not have a broad mandate to examine the political decisions to go to war.

The inquiry, to be headed by Lord Butler, who served as private secretary to former prime ministers Margaret Thatcher, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath, will work largely behind closed doors and report its findings to Mr. Blair before Parliament adjourns this summer.

As such, it will be of much shorter duration than the inquiry that President Bush said Monday that he will establish to examine intelligence on Iraq and report in 2005.

"I think it is right," Mr. Blair said in a morning meeting with a parliamentary committee, "that we have a look at the intelligence that we received and whether it is accurate or not."

But the prime minister said he was opposed to any inquiry that reviewed the political judgments to go to war and how intelligence findings were used in support of those judgments.

Mr. Blair made the announcement during a question-and-answer session with parliamentary committee chairmen.

In shirt sleeves, the prime minister was affable and in good humor, admitting recent mistakes in how he had handled major legislation and asserting that the period for questioning his integrity over the preparations for war had come to an end with Lord Hutton's verdict last week. Lord Hutton found that the government had not exaggerated or deliberately distorted the intelligence on Iraq to persuade a reluctant public to go to war.

Mr. Blair said that Lord Hutton's was the third full inquiry into circumstances related to the war and that the only thing left to examine was the intelligence process itself.

"I honestly think that the political judgment has got to be in the end the government and Parliament and you can't subcontract that to a committee and I don't believe frankly that the committee would want to look into that," Mr. Blair said.

"What we should have is a proper inquiry into the intelligence," he added, but "we do not in my view need an inquiry into the political decision to go to war."

Hours later, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, appeared before the full house and spelled out the mandate of the new inquiry.

The announcement touched off a lengthy debate in Parliament over whether the inquiry will settle the most contentious questions of how political leaders used intelligence findings. In the view of some experts the findings should have been subjected to more rigorous questioning before they were used to support the assertion that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to the region and to "the stability of the world," as Mr. Blair warned in September 2002.

Robin Cook, a former foreign secretary under Mr. Blair, asked from the floor of the House of Commons, "Does he really believe he can separate the intelligence judgment on the threat from the political judgment to go to war?" But other members, like Ann Clwyd, pointed out that even the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq believed that Mr. Hussein had chemical and biological weapons that he was ready to use on them in March 2003. She called it a "disgrace" that the international community had not acted sooner to end the "genocide" that she said Mr. Hussein was practicing against ethnic Kurds and Shiite Muslims.

Michael Howard, the Tory opposition leader, said his party supported the inquiry because Mr. Blair had promised that all questions on how intelligence was used in the political decision-making "came fairly and squarely within the remit of this inquiry." That assertion by Mr. Howard is likely to be tested early as the panel gets down to work.

Also appointed to the inquiry were Sir John Chilcot and Field Marshal Lord Inge and two members of the House of Commons, Ann Taylor from the Labor Party and Michael Mates from the Conservative Party.

The Liberal Democratic Party refused to endorse the inquiry after lengthy negotiations with Mr. Blair and his aides on Monday night.

Menzies Campbell, speaking for Liberal Democrats during today's debate, said that he had concluded that Mr. Blair had walled off an examination of political decision-making. The party therefore withdrew because "any inquiry" that failed to address the foundation of Mr. Blair's judgments over going to war "would be unlikely to command public confidence."

For his part, Mr. Blair said an inquiry had become necessary after a chief weapons analyst, David A. Kay, said in Washington that stocks of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons may not have existed and that intelligence assumptions about the immediate threat from Mr. Hussein may have been broadly wrong.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03/international/europe/03CND-BRIT.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

February 3, 2004

Pg. 14

## **U.S. Treads Carefully With Libya**

By Robin Wright, Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is scheduled to open a political dialogue with Libya on Friday in London, with the Bush administration also considering sending a State Department envoy to Tripoli to discuss diplomatic issues with senior Libyan officials, U.S. officials said yesterday.

But the Bush administration is split over the next steps to take with the government of Moammar Gaddafi, with the Pentagon resisting major reciprocal gestures in response to Tripoli's agreement to surrender its weapons of mass destruction, the officials added.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said yesterday that Libya's cooperation warranted deepening the level of engagement through "political openings and developments," as promised by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair when they announced Tripoli's agreement to hand over all equipment and data for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

"We've seen a fascinating sign of change in Libyan attitudes," Powell said in an interview with editors and reporters at The Washington Post.

"We've now had a couple weeks of action on removal and verification [of weaponry], and we've learned a lot, and it was appropriate at this point that we begin a political dialogue to see what lies ahead. We're still removing material and we're still verifying, but it is a fundamentally changed situation with respect to Libya."

Assistant Secretary of State William Burns and British officials will meet with their Libyan counterparts to discuss the next steps. One possibility is to lift the ban on Americans traveling to Libya once Libya completes the dismantling of its weapons programs, U.S. officials said. Pentagon policymakers are balking, however, at other steps that U.S. officials had thought were in the pipeline. And they are actively opposed to taking Tripoli off the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, which comes out annually in the spring.

"There's a cold wind blowing on a number of forward-leaning, reciprocal moves that we thought we'd queued up. And there's outright opposition to removing Libya from the list of the state sponsors of terrorism," said a well-placed U.S. official who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Although the State Department issues the list, making any changes to it involves an interagency decision, and Pentagon opposition could kill prospects of formal removal of Libya this year, U.S. officials said. Some officials and Libya experts are concerned that failing to provide the promised diplomatic carrot could frustrate and disillusion officials in Tripoli who encouraged cooperation with the United States and Britain.

On other countries, Powell indicated that the strongest prospect for removal from the terrorism list may be Sudan, which hosted al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. Powell said he hopes negotiations later this month to end Sudan's civil war can produce agreement on the disputed oil-rich area of Abyei, the last major hurdle. A formal peace accord would be the key in getting Sudan off the list, U.S. officials say.

But Powell also said Syria is even further away than it was last year, after failing to respond to concerns he outlined during talks with President Bashar Assad in Damascus. "They started doing a few things, but it wasn't adequate," he said.

Powell said the time had come for the Syrians to "take a hard look" at what is happening in the region "and see whether or not they want to modify some of their policies."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6996-2004Feb2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

## US Seeks Better WMD Defence

By Andrew Koch, JDW Bureau Chief, Washington, DC

Seeking to bolster a lagging ability to detect, defend against and respond to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the US Department of Defense (DoD) is beefing up efforts to counter such threats. These moves include adding additional forces dedicated to the task and re-organising what has been a confusing and diffuse group of units assigned to conduct such missions.

The moves come as defence officials note that their experiences in Iraq illustrated the limited ability of the US to defend others on the battlefield such as civilians and allies against such attacks because the units responsible for WMD defence were fully engaged protecting US forces. And, they add, better military capabilities are needed to mitigate the consequences of such an event at home and abroad. Moreover, difficulties with the post major-conflict WMD search in Iraq led the army to realise that better capabilities were needed, according to Lt Col George Lecakes, Executive Officer of a newly created unit called the Guardian Brigade. As another defence official noted: "Nobody was really in charge of exploitation."

To help resolve the problem, the US Army created the new brigade: an active-duty unit intended to increase the service's ability to respond to WMD incidents. The Guardian Brigade's goal is to be able to conduct simultaneous multiple operations in both the US homeland (one incident) and overseas (two regions). The brigade draws on existing army assets such as the Technical Escort Unit, consolidating them into a single cohesive organisation.

The brigade was formed following an army review of the service's chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defence capabilities. Those capabilities were so dispersed, Col Lecakes said in an interview late last year, that "it became a management nightmare".

Although the brigade was officially created last October, it is still not fully operational, Col Lecakes said, with the biggest challenge being finding enough qualified specialists. The army plans eventually to expand the brigade into the Army CBRNE Command. This would provide "full-spectrum homeland defence support to civil authorities" and also help the military standardise its approach to such crises. It would help other units such as the joint Air and Army National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs) to develop doctrine and provide them with some specialised training.

Those teams, intended to provide assistance to local authorities in the event of a WMD attack, are being expanded. They would grow from the current 32 to at least one in each of the 50 states and the four US-administered territories. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, said last month that 11 new teams would initially be added with \$88 million appropriated in Fiscal Year 2004.

However, rather than rely on a state-by-state organisation, a recently published Defense Science Board study on 'DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security' recommends the CSTs be brought together in regional structures. That would allow 10 of the units to be given improved capabilities, the report notes, adding that a standing joint headquarters should be established in each of the 50 states to "have strong operational and planning ties to the US Northern Command".

A further new DoD effort under way to address WMD defence - called the Guardian Project - is a joint effort that began last October to help improve the security of military installations against CBRNE attacks. The project will initially target 185 domestic US facilities and 15 overseas bases in the next five years.

### **Guardian Brigade capabilities**

In the biological and chemical arenas, brigade capabilities include:

- \* sampling
- \* detection
- \* monitoring
- \* limited decontamination
- \* assessment
- \* disposal/neutralisation
- \* agent analysis
- \* incident management

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

# Final Confirmation of Ricin Awaited as Senate Is Disrupted

By CARL HULSE and DAVID STOUT

Published: February 3, 2004

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 — The discovery of a white powder believed to be the poison ricin in the mail room of Senator Bill Frist, the Republican majority leader, disrupted the work of the Senate today and revived memories of the anthrax contaminations of late 2001.

The Capitol Police said they received the report of the material in a room of the Dirksen Senate Office Building near the Capitol about 3 p.m. on Monday and conducted initial tests that came back positive for ricin. The material was sent to a state laboratory in Maryland, which was expected to announce final confirmation this afternoon.

Sixteen people who work on the fourth floor of the huge building underwent decontamination. None became ill or showed any symptoms of poisoning, Congressional officials said today. Senator Frist, who is a physician, said this afternoon that since the effects of ricin usually appear in four to eight hours, the absence of any illnesses a full day later was heartening.

The discovery in the Dirksen building prompted officials to shut down the Hart and Russell Senate office buildings as well, forcing the cancellation of committee meetings on what would normally have been a busy day, following the submission of President Bush's \$2.4 trillion budget on Monday. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Treasury Secretary John W. Snow were among those who had been scheduled to appear before Senate committees today.

Dr. Frist said business would continue on the Senate floor. But the Capitol Police chief, Terrance Gainer, said it could take three to five days to examine the three Senate office buildings floor by floor, raising the probability that more hearings will be delayed.

All unopened mail in the Senate office buildings was collected and removed for testing.

By midday today, no contaminated envelope had been found in or near Senator Frist's office, so the authorities had limited clues to go on. Chief Gainer said investigators had not ruled out the possibility that the ricin came into the building by special shipment, as opposed to mail. "We haven't ruled anything out," the chief said at a news briefing. The Capitol Police are working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Joint Terrorism Task Force, although officials said today it was premature to speculate on the source of the poison.

Senator Frist said soon after the discovery that "somebody in all likelihood manufactured this with intent to harm." Today, on the Senate floor, he sought to reassure his colleagues and Congressional workers. "All air sampling and environmental studies today are negative, with the exception of what was found in that single office at that site," said the senator, who is a heart-and-lung transplant surgeon.,

Ricin (pronounced RICE-in) is a poison that can be made from the waste left by the processing of castor beans. It is much easier than anthrax for a nonscientist to make, but scientists consider it much less dangerous. On the other hand, the irradiation equipment that now treats mail bound for Capitol Hill and can kill anthrax spores is useless against a chemical poison like ricin.

Ricin works by getting inside the cells of a person's body and preventing the cells from making protein, without which the cells can die. No antidote exists, so treatment consists of giving victims medical care to minimize the effects, according to the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The severity of the effects can vary, depending on whether a person inhales ricin, or swallows it, or is injected with it. In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian writer and journalist who was living in London, died after he was attacked by a man with an umbrella rigged to inject a tiny ricin pellet under his skin. Scientists say death by swallowing or breathing would require a much bigger dose.

Some reports have indicated that ricin may have been used in the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980's. And a letter discovered last Oct. 15 in a post office in Greenville, S.C., was found to contain ricin. The typewritten letter was addressed to the Department of Transportation and complained about impending changes in work regulations for truck drivers.

"I have easy access to castor pulp," the writer of that letter said, referring to the processing waste.

Despite the dangers of ricin, scientists for the federal disease-control agency have noted that it is stable and little affected by temperature extremes; that accidental exposure is highly unlikely, and that it cannot be spread from person to person through casual contact.

Soon after the discovery on Monday in Dr. Frist's mail room, the building's ventilation system was shut down and the mail room workers were moved to another room in the building for medical supervision. Chief Gainer said this afternoon that no contamination had been found in any air filters.

Officials said initially that the suspect powder had been sent to an Army laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md. Later, they amended their remarks, saying the sample had been sent to a Maryland state lab.

Because ricin is both more stable and less dangerous than anthrax, which can be deadly even when inhaled in small amounts, the decontamination resulting from Monday's discovery may be far less involved, and expensive, than the multimillion-dollar clean-up operation on Capitol Hill following the anthrax mailings in the fall of 2001.

At that time, envelopes containing anthrax were mailed to the Capitol offices of Senators Tom Daschle of South Dakota, the Democratic leader, and Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont Democrat who was then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The letter to Mr. Leahy was found to contain a particularly deadly dose.

Two Washington postal employees who worked in the enormous building that processed the envelopes later died. The Hart Senate Office Building was subsequently closed for months for decontamination.

A new system for handling mail for the Capitol was instituted after those assaults. There have been other incidents of suspicious substances since then, though they have proven to be mostly false alarms.

The memories of the 2001 mailings remain fresh, and maddening. A newspaper photographer in Florida, an elderly woman in Connecticut and a woman in New York City also died of anthrax poisoning that autumn, and several other people were made ill by other tainted letters.

The authorities have several of the contaminated letters in their possession, addressed in childlike block letters and mailed through a post office in the Trenton, N.J., area. But no one has been arrested.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03/national/03CND-POIS.html?hp>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

## Suspicious Powder Found in Frist Office

6 of 8 Tests Positive for Lethal Toxin Ricin

*By Martin Weil*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Tuesday, February 3, 2004; Page A01

A powder found in an office of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist tested positive yesterday for ricin, a lethal poison, prompting authorities to impose tight security and carry out street-side decontaminations.

There were no reports of any illness, and Frist (R-Tenn.), a physician, offered reassurance.

"Nobody has been hurt, and everyone is fine," he said at a late-night news conference.

Nevertheless, at least parts of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, where the powder was found, remained closed early this morning, while a definitive test was conducted on the powder. Authorities said they would announce by 5 a.m. what parts of the building would be open today.

At the 11 p.m. news conference, U.S. Capitol Police Chief Terrance W. Gainer said that six of the first eight tests conducted on the powder showed that the substance could be ricin, a poison with no known antidote. The powder was found about 3 p.m.

"We're taking this as seriously as you can possibly take it," D.C. Police Chief Charles H. Ramsey said.

Witnesses said that several people apparently had undergone decontamination last night in a van parked outside the building and that as many as 40 people in all would undergo the process before being sent home.

Three people who had apparently gone through the van came out into the cold late last night in T-shirts and pants; the fourth was wearing a white jumpsuit. One ran down the block and into the Dirksen building.

According to officials, the powder was discovered in Room 454, which was described as a mailroom that is part of Frist's offices.

At first, according to accounts from witnesses, officials displayed some uncertainty as to the seriousness of the problem.

A member of Frist's staff said that an interoffice e-mail sent about 3 p.m. told everyone to stay put. It was followed an hour later by a message declaring everything was all right.

Around 6:30 p.m., 10 or so Frist staff members who were at work were led out of their office and into an Appropriations Committee room.

Late last night, a few members of Frist's staff were being held in his office, a Senate source said.

According to Gainer, the first of the tests on the powder came back positive for ricin; the second was negative.

Three more tests were all positive. After that, three more tests were conducted at an outside laboratory. Two of those three turned out positive, Gainer said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7399-2004Feb2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

## **Experts Describe Tight-Knit Nuclear Black Market**

*Millions in sales motivated by 'personal greed and ambition'*

By George Jahn, Associated Press

VIENNA, Austria — The nuclear black market that supplied Iran, Libya and North Korea is small, tight-knit and appears to have been severely hurt by the exposure of its reputed head, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, diplomats and weapons experts said.

They describe the network that circumvented international controls to sell blueprints, hardware and know-how to countries running covert nuclear programs as involving people closely dependent on one another.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, who founded Pakistan's nuclear program, is emerging as the head of the ring believed to have been the main supplier through middlemen over three continents. A Pakistani government official revealed yesterday that Mr. Khan has acknowledged in a written statement transferring nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

The revelations came as Pakistan completed its investigation that began in late November, officials said. President Pervez Musharraf is expected to announce the results of the probe in an address to the nation after a period of national holidays ends Thursday.

Mr. Khan was fired Saturday as a scientific adviser to the prime minister.

The sales, during the late 1980s and in the early and mid-1990s, were motivated by "personal greed and ambition," the official said, and the black market dealings were not authorized by the Pakistani government.

European diplomats also said it appeared unlikely that Gen. Musharraf sanctioned the deals. But with Mr. Khan close to previous governments, senior civilian and military officials before Gen. Musharraf's takeover in 1999 likely knew of some of the dealings, they said in interviews yesterday and this past week.

Pakistani officials said for the first time yesterday that two former army chiefs have been questioned in the scandal but not implicated.

Gen. Jehangir Karamat and Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, a nationalist and strong advocate of a strategic alliance with Iran during his tenure, denied they had authorized nuclear transfers, the official said.

The diplomats described Mr. Khan as the head of an operation likely involved in supplying both North Korea and Iran with uranium enrichment technology and hardware in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Libya was also a customer, receiving an array of nuclear-related equipment and know-how that included blueprints of a nuclear bomb handed over to U.S. and British intelligence officials late last month, they said.

Middlemen responsible for meshing supply and demand were located in European capitals, Asia and the Middle East, they said, typically working with Iranian, Libyan and North Korean diplomats stationed abroad.

Hundreds of millions of dollars changed hands over the past 15 years, in deals as easy to hide as a floppy disc storing sensitive drawings or as bulky as thousands of centrifuge parts for nuclear enrichment, a key part in building weapons, the diplomats said.

A key beneficiary appears to be Mr. Khan, whose salary as a civil servant cannot account for what Pakistani newspapers say are far-flung real estate holdings and other assets worth millions of dollars.

Mr. Khan, who hasn't spoken publicly about the charges but has been prevented from leaving Pakistan, has denied during interrogations with investigators that he made the transfers for personal gain.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040202-102559-1153r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

## **Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics of National Strategies Related to Terrorism.**

by Randall A. Yim, managing director, homeland security and justice issues, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform.

GAO-04-408T, February 3.

<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)